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Criminalizing Work and Non-Work: The
Disciplining of Immigrant and African
American Workers
Shirley Lung
14 U. MASS. L. REV. 290
ABSTRACT
The realities of low-wage work in the United States challenge our basic notions of
freedom and equality. Many low-wage workers share the condition of being stuck in
jobs toiling excessive hours against their will for less than poverty wages in
autocratic workplaces. Yet the racial politics of immigration and labor are often used
to stir hostility between low-income United States citizens—especially African
Americans—and undocumented immigrants. Perceived competition for jobs and
racist stereotypes are exploited by opportunistic politicians and employers as well to
produce frictions between workers who face similar conditions.
Still, there is a strong basis for undocumented and African American low-wage
workers to unify. Both communities have experienced a deeply fraught relationship
to freedom and coercion in which criminalization has figured prominently. This
Article examines the similar attributes between two regimes of criminalization. The
first regime is the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), which
has resulted in the criminalization of work for undocumented immigrants. IRCA,
enacted more than thirty years ago, was the first time that Congress prohibited
employers from hiring workers who are unauthorized to work in the United States.
The second regime is the criminalization of non-work (i.e., the condition of being
unemployed or of quitting one’s job to search for better employment elsewhere) for
black workers in the post-Civil War South through the enforcement of vagrancy
laws. A crucial feature of the Black Codes enacted after the Civil War to
comprehensively restrict freed black men and women were vagrancy statutes that
provided the coercive apparatus for pushing freed black men and women into forced
labor.
This Article juxtaposes the two enforcement regimes and brings together two areas
of literature to draw attention to intersecting features of criminalization. Foremost,
the criminalization of work and non-work become instruments of employer control
in which state power is placed into private hands to fracture worker unity, to terrorize
workers, and to discipline workers. Further, both regimes of criminalization have
depended on racialized narratives and stereotypes to rationalize criminalization. This
Article draws these historical parallels with the hope that such a perspective can help
build meaningful alliances between undocumented immigrants and African
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Americans to take apart systems of criminalization that advance exploitation,
immobility, and inequality.
AUTHOR’S NOTE
Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. I deeply appreciate
my colleagues Ruthann Robson, Andrea McArdle, Frank Deale, and Steve Loffredo
for their invaluable insights, comments, and suggestions. Andrea McArdle gave
generously of her time on many occasions. I owe a very special note of gratitude to
Ruthann Robson for all her advice and support throughout the writing, editing, and
submission process. Many thanks to Veronica Joya, Thomas Power, and Ying-Ying
Ma for their excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The realities of low-wage work in the United States challenge our
basic notions of freedom and equality. Many low-wage workers toil
excessive hours against their will for less than poverty wages in
autocratic workplaces.1 Other low-wage workers barely cobble a living
on part-time work as employers drive labor costs down by discarding
full-time jobs.2 With weakened unions, the constant threat of
outsourcing, and the ascendancy of a service economy built on low
pay, the right to quit is more fiction than reality for many low-wage
workers.3
These alarming trends hit undocumented immigrant workers
especially hard. The Supreme Court has sanctioned the unequal status
of undocumented immigrant workers in two cases.4 According to some
labor organizers and advocates, United States immigration laws have
spawned modern-day slave labor.5
In fact, “unfree” and “bound” labor in various forms, including
slavery, has been a mainstay of the United States economy since the
founding of this country.6 A look at history and law reveals
1

2

3

4

5

6

See VALERIE WILSON & JANELLE JONES, ECON. POLICY INST., WORKING
HARDER OR FINDING IT HARDER TO WORK 1, 27–31 (2018); Meagan Day,
Working
Hard,
Hardly
Working,
JACOBIN
(Mar.
5,
2018),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/labor-workforce-unemployment-overwork
[https://perma.cc/F4Y6-XWK9].
See Bertil Videt & Daniëlle de Winter, Job Insecurity as the Norm, BROKER
(Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Articles/Job-insecurity-as-thenorm#t8 [https://perma.cc/9PJP-C62U]. See generally LONNIE GOLDEN, ECON.
POLICY INST., STILL FALLING SHORT ON HOURS AND PAY: PART-TIME WORK
BECOMING NEW NORMAL (2016); see also LOUIS UCHITELLE, THE DISPOSABLE
AMERICAN: LAYOFFS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2006).
See Stanley Aronowitz et al., Work, Work, and More Work: Whose Economic
Rights?, 16 CUNY L. REV. 391, 399–400 (2013).
See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002); Sure–
Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883 (1984). See infra Part II.B (discussing the
impact of Hoffman).
See JUDITH P. MILLER ET AL., WORKERS RIGHTS PROJECT OF YALE LAW SCH.,
REPEALING IRCA LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE 5 (2005) (on file with author); From
Slavery to Employer Sanctions, The Modern-Day Slave Law, BREAK THE
CHAINS! (N.Y.C., N.Y.), May 1, 2017, at 2–3, http://cswa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/2017-MAYDAY-newsletter-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9F4Q-T6M8] [hereinafter NMASS, BREAK THE CHAINS!].
DOUGLAS HAY & PAUL CRAVEN, Introduction, in MASTERS, SERVANTS, AND
MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN & THE EMPIRE 1562–1955, at 21–23, 26–28 (Douglas
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criminalization as a mode of labor regulation and racial control that
was central to the project of maintaining a class of unequal and unfree
black workers after slavery.7 Post-Civil War, criminal laws
proliferated to empower planters and other southern employers to
restrict the mobility of newly freed black men and women who sought
to reject “slavery’s hours and slavery’s pace.”8 This history of
criminalization bears directly on the criminalization of African
American communities today, resulting in the mass incarceration of
black men and women,9 the use of cheap prison labor by
corporations,10 and the freedom of private employers to discriminate
against people who have criminal convictions.11
Criminalization also lies at the crux of modern immigration laws
regulating undocumented workers. Over three decades ago, Congress
enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”).12
It was the first time Congress made the private workplace a direct site
of immigration regulation by banning the employment of

7

8

9

10

11

12

Hay & Paul Craven eds., 2004) (describing repressive master-servant law,
indentured servants, convict labor, and slavery in the British Empire, including
the early American colonies). See generally CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW,
LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993) (tracing the
impact of British master-servant law in constructing the employment
relationship in colonial America).
See Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the
Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 677–81
(2004).
WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM’S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN
WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL 1861–1915, at 14–15 (1991) [hereinafter
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE]. See William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in
the South, 1865–1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31, 33–34 (1976)
[hereinafter Cohen, Involuntary Servitude].
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 60–61 (2010).
Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis,
Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703,
720–23 (2010).
See id. at 724; UCLA LABOR CTR. ET AL., READY TO WORK, UPROOTING
INEQUITY: BLACK WORKERS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 31–32 (2017),
https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/UCLA_BWC_report_5-3_27-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3G7N-NDNR].
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended in scattered statutes of 8 U.S.C.).
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undocumented workers.13 The “employer sanctions” provisions of
IRCA prohibit employers from knowingly hiring or employing
unauthorized workers.14 IRCA also requires employers to verify
whether an employee is authorized to work through the “I-9”
documentation process and to maintain certain kinds of paperwork.15
Employers who violate either the substantive or administrative
provisions of IRCA are subject to civil and criminal penalties.16 IRCA
does not, however, impose criminal sanctions on undocumented
workers who seek, solicit, or engage in employment.17
IRCA’s employer sanctions regime is momentous not only as
legislation promoting employer enforcement of immigration law. It is
a potent instance of labor regulation bearing certain similarities to
systems of criminalization invoked by employers to control black and
poor white workers in earlier eras of United States history. Some
commentators have begun to emphasize these shared characteristics,
arguing that IRCA recalls or “perpetuates the shameful legacy of
slavery in the U.S.”18 by handing over state enforcement powers to
employers who wield such power to “terrorize [] workers and suppress
worker dissent.”19 Labor organizers, unions, scholars, and lawyers
publicize the “corrosive effects” of deputizing employers to enforce
immigration laws in the workplace.20 Unscrupulous employers can
take advantage of their enforcement powers by selectively applying
the I-9 documentation process to terminate unauthorized workers who
13

14
15
16
17

18

19
20

Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants:
The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 193 (2007).
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2004).
Id. § 1324a(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 1324a(f).
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 404 (2012) (holding that an Arizona
statute that made it a misdemeanor for undocumented immigrants to knowingly
apply for or engage in work was preempted by IRCA).
MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 5; see also Maria L. Ontiveros, Migrant Labour
in the United States: Working Beneath the Floor for Free Labour? (Univ. S.F.
Sch.
Law,
Research
Paper
No.
2014-19,
2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457257
[https://perma.cc/RZ6S-US3V] [hereinafter Ontiveros, Migrant Labour]; Maria
L. Ontiveros, Is Modern Day Slavery a Private Act or a Public System of
Oppression, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 665, 668–69 (2016) (examining the rhetoric
of slavery used by immigrant workers and advocates).
Wishnie, supra note 13, at 216.
Id. at 211.
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protest exploitation, thereby squelching collective efforts to improve
working conditions.21
Equally significant, and underscored by labor and immigration
advocates, are the pernicious effects of IRCA on U.S.-born workers.
Exploitation becomes universalized as employers use the
criminalization of undocumented workers to systematically undermine
the labor and employment rights of U.S.-born and other legalized
workers in low-wage industries.22 When employers use IRCA as a
union-busting tool to purge the workplace of immigrant workers who
support an organizing drive, all workers at the workplace—regardless
of their immigrant or citizen status—are weakened.23 When employers
use their IRCA enforcement powers to intimidate undocumented
workers into accepting sub-minimum wages and conditions, citizen
and other legalized workers are also forced to compete in a race-tothe-bottom.24 Based on the racial and economic stratification of jobs,
the U.S.-born workers most likely harmed by IRCA’s employer
sanctions provisions come from communities of color. Low-wage
employment falls disproportionately on African Americans, Latinos,
and Asians, who often labor beside undocumented immigrant coworkers.25

21

22

23
24

25

See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 3; NMASS, BREAK THE CHAINS!,
supra note 5, at 1–3; HAEYOUNG YOON ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT,
WORKPLACE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS: A LEGAL
TREATISE 1, 4–6 (2013) (on file with author; updated version forthcoming from
publisher) [hereinafter NELP, WORKPLACE RIGHTS]; David Bacon & Bill Ong
Hing, The Rise and Fall of Employer Sanctions, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 77, 88–
89 (2010); Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented Workers: Crossing the Borders of
Immigration and Workplace Law, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 611, 630–33
(2012); Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law
Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace,
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303, 308–10 (2010).
See infra Part II.C (discussing the impact of IRCA and Hoffman on citizen and
authorized workers).
See infra Part II.C.
See infra text accompanying notes 145–55 (discussing the impact of IRCA on
the ability of U.S.-born and other legalized workers to enforce labor law
standards).
See Llezlie Green Coleman, Rendered Invisible: African American Low-Wage
Workers and the Workplace Exploitation Paradigm, 60 HOW. L.J. 61, 69–72
(2016) (discussing demographics of low-wage employment among African
Americans). Coleman argues that the current paradigm for understanding
workplace exploitation focuses on immigrant workers’ exploitation, especially
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The use of criminal sanctions to terrorize and repress workers, to
control their wage demands and working conditions, and to attack their
mobility has deep historical roots.26 This Article examines the similar
attributes between the criminalization of work for undocumented
immigrants under IRCA and the criminalization of non-work for black
workers in the post-Civil War South. Specifically, this Article
juxtaposes the two enforcement regimes and brings together two areas
of literature to draw attention to intersecting features of
criminalization, in which state power is used by private employers to
discipline and control workers.
The Black Codes enacted by southern legislatures in 1865-1867
sought to comprehensively control and restrict freed black men and
women in every aspect of life, especially as workers.27 Vagrancy laws
forcing newly freed Blacks into working for exploitative wages under
inhumane conditions28 were central to a system of criminalization
aimed at preserving a captive workforce and abridging the political
and social freedom of black people.29
This Article argues that IRCA’s employer sanctions and the postCivil War vagrancy statutes reflect one another in important ways.
First and foremost, embedded in the criminalization of work and nonwork are efforts to undercut workers’ autonomy, even when employers
are ostensibly targeted. This lies at the heart of both labor contexts.
The autonomy at stake is the freedom to challenge work conditions
directly through organizing or indirectly by “voting with your feet”
through seeking better work elsewhere. The criminalization of work
and non-work become instruments of employer control in which state
power is placed into private hands to suppress worker dissent, worker
organizing, and worker radicalism. The price paid by workers is
mobility, freedom, and autonomy.

26

27

28
29

Latino workers, and has contributed to the invisibility of African American lowwage workers. Id. at 63–64.
See supra note 6 and accompany text; infra Part III (discussing vagrancy,
contract labor, anti-enticement statutes, and emigrant agent laws in the postCivil War South).
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863–1877, at 199–200 (updated ed. 2014); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN,
RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 47–48 (3d ed. 2013).
See infra Part III.A.
See White, supra note 7, at 670, 679–80; Jonathan M. Wiener, Class Structure
and Economic Development in the American South, 1865–1955, 84 AM. HIST.
REV. 970, 981–83 (1979).
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Second, employers use the criminalization of targeted groups of
workers to repress broader groups of workers. Criminalization
provides the coercive apparatus by which employers pit workers
against one another and keep all workers in their place.
Third, the enforcement of IRCA against undocumented workers
and the enforcement of the post-Civil War vagrancy statutes against
black workers have depended on criminalization narratives for their
effectiveness. These narratives exploit racist stereotypes to incite fear
and resentment, and to rationalize criminalization. The criminalization
narratives used to justify post-Civil War vagrancy statutes survive in
present-day form to stigmatize African American workers and to
obfuscate the impact of structural racism on the employment
opportunities of African American communities.30
The criminalization of work for undocumented immigrants and of
non-work for African Americans after the Civil War represent
different experiences that cannot be conflated. The historical context
of criminalization of non-work—backed by systemic state and private
violence—growing out of slavery has to be kept in mind.31 This
Article does not argue that the two systems of criminalization are
identical, only that they share crucial features that illuminate how
criminalization—i.e., state law enforcement power—is used to
undermine equality, mobility, and freedom in specific labor contexts.
As well, workers under both systems of criminalization have not
stood as passive victims. They have resisted by exercising agency and
autonomy wherever possible and with great risk. Slavery “gave rise to
numerous forms of black resistance.”32 After the Civil War, and even
during post-Reconstruction,33 black workers “resist[ed] plantation
30

31

32
33

See infra text accompanying notes 158–67 (discussing derogative stereotyping
of African American workers) and notes 268–71 (discussing the “welfare
queen” narrative in the welfare reform debate).
See Jennifer M. Chacón, Civil Rights, Immigrants’ Rights, Human Rights:
Lessons from the Life and Works of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 32 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 465, 466–69 (2008) (explaining that some critics of the
contemporary immigrants’ rights movement reject analogies between the
present-day conditions of immigrants and the plight of African Americans in the
South during the Jim Crow era). Some commentators maintain that comparisons
between the two are unfounded because of “the historical asymmetries of the
[two] movements,” given the difference between voluntary migration and forced
migration through slavery. Id. at 468.
FONER, supra note 27, at 436.
But see id. at 595 (Post-Reconstruction black rural laborers faced stiffened white
resistance and heightened violence, making “collective action by rural
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discipline”34 through acts of labor militancy that included direct
confrontation with employers, strikes, work stoppages, refusal to make
contracts,35 and participation in evolving grassroots movements.36
Further, vagrancy and contract labor laws never succeeded in entirely
cutting off black mobility.37
Similarly, undocumented workers continue to organize and join
unions and workers’ centers despite IRCA and threats of detention and
deportation. They have participated in groundbreaking organizing
campaigns in the janitorial, drywall, home care, domestic work, and
food processing industries.38 Their successes show that they can be on
the “leading edge” in establishing new forms of organizing that
challenge the traditional labor law regime.39 Some workers’ centers
seek to bridge the immigration divide by trying to unify undocumented
immigrants as well as African American and Puerto Rican low-wage
workers in community and workplace struggles.40
This Article draws historical parallels between undocumented
workers under IRCA and black workers under the post-Civil War
statutes with the hope that this can help workers find new ways to
understand one another’s experiences. Perhaps these parallels can
contribute to a sense of shared identity that workers can draw upon in
surmounting the politics of racial division. The repeal of IRCA’s
employer sanctions provisions will require broad groups of workers to
engage in the fight for repeal. Addressing the economic

34
35

36
37

38

39
40

laborers . . . all but impossible.”). Foner explains, “Time and again during the
1880s and 1890s, Southern sheriffs, backed by state militias, crushed efforts to
organize agricultural workers.” Id. Yet Blacks continued to assert their
autonomy. Id.
Id. at 210, 573, 602; see also infra text accompanying note 196.
See FONER, supra note 27, at 281–82; Michael W. Fitzgerald, John Hope
Franklin and His Reconstruction, in FRANKLIN, supra note 27, at 244.
Fitzgerald, supra note 35, at 244–45.
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at xv–xvi (discussing Black resistance
to “efforts to immobilize them”); Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at
59–60 (explaining “the paradoxical situation whereby involuntary servitude
coexisted with a good deal of black mobility” and “resourceful blacks could and
did get around” the restrictions of that system).
See, e.g., Ruth Milkman, Immigrant Workers and the Future of American Labor,
26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 295, 295, 297 (2011); Kent Wong, A New Labor
Movement for a New Working Class: Unions, Worker Centers, and Immigrants,
36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 205, 206–07 (2014).
Milkman, supra note 38, at 295, 299.
See infra text accompanying notes 309–11.
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marginalization of certain African American communities will require
broad groups of workers to engage in the fight against structural
racism. Status differentiation through criminalizing targeted classes of
workers not only splinters workers, but also sanctions coercion,
inequality, immobility, and exploitation. Viewing IRCA against the
criminal laws that regulated black workers after slavery highlights
shared characteristics between these enforcement regimes and will
point to the alliances that must be forged between immigrant and
citizen communities to defeat laws that hurt the interests of low-wage
workers.
Part I of this Article examines the employer sanctions provisions of
IRCA as a system of criminalization invoked by employers to
discipline undocumented and citizen low-wage workers. Part II
discusses post-Civil War criminal laws that regulated vagrancy,
prohibited employers from recruiting another employer’s workforce,
and barred the interstate recruitment of black workers. Part III explores
the similarities between IRCA and post-Civil War criminal laws in
legalizing inequality and exploitation. This Article concludes by
reflecting on the need for alliances between undocumented immigrants
and African American communities that each have experienced their
own history of criminalization in a work context. These alliances are
needed to repeal IRCA’s employer sanctions, to pursue common
interests in other struggles both inside and outside the workplace, and
to undo systems of criminalization that advance exploitation and
oppression.
II. IRCA’S EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AS CRIMINALIZATION OF WORK
A. Employer Sanctions as Employer Swords
It is counter-intuitive that a law purporting to penalize employers
has become a tool of intimidation wielded by unscrupulous employers
against workers who assert their rights.41 Most scholars and labor
advocates who follow the intersection of labor and immigration laws
agree that IRCA’s employer sanctions regime has been disastrous for
workers.42 According to Professor Michael Wishnie, “IRCA’s most
41

42

See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1103, 1119–20, 1126 (2009).
E.g., Saucedo, supra note 21, at 307; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 216; see also
Jennifer J. Lee, Redefining the Legality of Undocumented Work, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 1617, 1628 (2018) (referring to the “disastrous effects” of IRCA).
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pernicious consequence has been to strengthen the coercive power
exercised by exploitative employers over non-citizens in the
workplace, overwhelming any disincentive based on the risk of civil
penalty and making employment of undocumented workers irresistible
in low-wage, labor-intensive industries.”43
“Employer sanctions” is a misnomer. IRCA deputizes employers
to enforce immigration laws.44 By empowering and requiring
employers to check the immigration status of workers,45 IRCA hands
state power to employers that they can conveniently use against
workers.46 At the same time, the risk of IRCA penalties on employers
who knowingly hire undocumented workers or who fail to comply
with the I-9 verification requirements is slim.47
For law-breaking employers, the cost-benefit calculus of hiring
undocumented workers and initially ignoring their obligation to verify
the status of workers is undeniably appealing.48 An employer might
never mention anything about IRCA and the I-9 form, that is, until a
43
44

45
46
47

48

Wishnie, supra note 13, at 215.
Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of
Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345,
348, 379 (2001); see Lee, supra note 41, at 1119–20.
Nessel, supra note 44, at 348, 379.
Wishnie, supra note 13, at 216; see Lee, supra note 41, at 1136–37.
Peter Brownell, Employer Sanctions and the Wages of Mexican Immigrants, 3
RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 70, 72–74 (2017); Saucedo, supra note 21, at
307–08; see also David Bacon, How Unions Help Immigrants Resist
Deportations, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 13, 2018), http://prospect.org/article/howunions-help-immigrants-resist-deportations
[https://perma.cc/D3DS-9ASC]
(“[F]ew employers pay [IRCA] penalties . . . . Even fewer are charged with
violating federal law.”); Muzaffar Chishti et al., Shifting Gears, Trump
Administration Launches High-Profile Worksite Enforcement Operations,
MIGRATION
POL’Y
INST.
(Jan.
24,
2018),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/shifting-gears-trump-administrationlaunches-high-profile-worksite-enforcement-operations
[https://perma.cc/D8KB-FRVZ] (discussing “checkered history” of enforcement
of employer sanctions and possible shift by Trump administration); Natalie
Kitroeff, Workplace Raids Signal Shifting Tactics in Immigration Fight, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/economy/immigrationraids.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share
[https://perma.cc/7CKY-9PHJ] (explaining that punishment of employers
violating IRCA has historically been weak but noting Trump’s current signaling
of increased worksite raids toward the goal of prosecuting employers and
detaining and removing undocumented workers).
Nessel, supra note 44, at 361; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 213.
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worker or group of workers challenges the employer’s failure to pay
the minimum wage or overtime pay, or complains about safety
violations, workloads, or discrimination.49 Then the employer will
resort to the I-9 form as a means to rid the workplace of undocumented
workers who are deemed troublemakers and to intimidate other
workers into submission.50 If an employer filled out I-9 forms for
workers at the time of their hire, he will hide behind the pretext of reverifying work documents or social security numbers to avoid rehiring
workers who protested exploitative demands, participated in labor
disputes, or engaged in collective bargaining.51 These manipulations of
IRCA shut down organizing by sowing fear, insecurity, and division
among workers.
The term “employer swords” reflects reality more accurately than
“employer sanctions.”52 IRCA’s apparatus of verifying work status
rests in the control of employers; the exercise of this power is usually
selective and strategic.53 Exploitative employers turn a blind eye to
immigration status as long as workers accommodate their demands.54
As soon as workers organize or lodge complaints, employers can
quickly resort to verifying immigration documents as an intimidation
tactic. It is at work sites with the most radicalized workers where

49

50
51

52
53

54

Saucedo, supra note 21, at 320 n.93 (quoting JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN
SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 49–50 (2005) (regarding
employers’ manipulation of I–9 requirements in retaliation against workers)).
See, e.g., Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., No. 22-CA-27468, 2009 WL 2868889,
at *39, *48–*49 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 4, 2009) (discussing employer’s violation of
IRCA verification requirements); Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., No. 29-CA25476, 2006 WL 3196754, at *9 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 1, 2006) (finding that an
employer violated IRCA when it demanded I-9 documents for an illegitimate
purpose rather than for the purpose of good-faith compliance with IRCA).
Saucedo, supra note 21, at 307; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 215.
See REBECCA SMITH & EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT,
WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON ICE, 4, 11–15 (2013) [hereinafter NELP, WORKERS’
RIGHTS ON ICE] (providing case studies illustrating the employer use of
reverification of I-9 forms to intimidate workers).
Nessel, supra note 44, at 362.
Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 2006 WL 3196754, at *9 (“[B]y conditioning
reinstatement upon providing proof of documented status, the . . . true motive
was not to comply with the provisions of IRCA.”).
See GORDON, supra note 49, at 49–50.
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unscrupulous employers are likely to brandish the I-9 form as a
sword.55
Employer exploitation under IRCA is not simply the product of
cost-benefit calculations of individual employers or of lax penalties
and inadequate enforcement against employers.56 The power of
employers to manipulate IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions
against workers is fixed in the law itself.57 IRCA is structured in favor
of employers.58 The law incorporates an affirmative good-faith defense
that releases an employer from liability under the “knowingly hire”
provisions.59 To qualify for the defense, an employer need only
establish that he or she conducted an I-9 document check in good faith
and that the documents tendered by the worker appeared to be genuine
and to relate to that worker.60 Compliance with the I-9 verification and
55

56

57
58

59

60

See supra text accompanying notes 48–51; Sewell Chan, Teamsters and
FreshDirect Spar Over Suspensions of Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
12, 2007, 12:08 PM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/12/teamstersand-freshdirect-spar-over-suspensions-of-immigrant-workers/
[https://perma.cc/MP9W-UUR3] (highlighting the controversy surrounding an I9 audit conveniently timed just before a union election); see also Muzaffar
Chishti & Charles Kamasaki, IRCA in Retrospect: Guideposts for Today’s
Immigration Reform, 9 MIGRATION POL’Y INST., at 3 (2014).
Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of
White-Collar Crime, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1051–52 (1990).
Id. at 1058–59.
Id. at 1060 (arguing that the continued hiring of undocumented workers despite
IRCA can be attributed to the structure of IRCA in carving out a good faith
defense for employers, thus “ensuring that violations of the ‘knowing hire’
provision—the real meat of the law—would be virtually risk-free”); Brownell,
supra note 47, at 72 (discussing the low risk of fines on employers because of
the availability of the good faith defense).
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (2004). See Calavita, supra note 56, at 1058–60
(explaining that the purported congressional justification for the good faith
defense was to protect innocent employers who might inadvertently discriminate
based on nationality in an effort to comply with IRCA verification
requirements). However, Professor Calavita observes that throughout the
legislative debates Congress left untouched the question of whether the good
faith defense would serve as a loophole that employers could use to avoid
detection for hiring undocumented workers. Id. at 1060.
8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2017). There is no obligation on the employer to
verify the authenticity of documents presented by workers. See Hiroshi
Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1760 (2010) (“As long as employers check documents
and do the paperwork, their risk of liability under [IRCA] is minimal. Further
probing only opens them to discrimination claims.”).
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paperwork requirements provides a structural loophole for employers
to hire undocumented workers without detection.61
Professor Kitty Calavita explains that compliance with IRCA was
redefined during the legislative process to include compliance with the
I-9 paperwork requirements.62 She argues that this generous definition
of employer compliance actively buffers employers from prosecution
under the “knowingly hire” provisions63 and, at the same time,
“guaranteed widespread violations” of IRCA by employers.64
Compliance with the I-9 substitutes for compliance with the essence of
IRCA—the ban against knowingly hiring unauthorized workers.65
The upshot was a toothless and symbolic law that conciliated two
contradictory policies.66 The resultant employer sanctions regime
mollified employers who had an economic interest in hiring
undocumented workers67 and, at the same time, it gave the appearance
of addressing the public’s demand that Congress “turn off the spigot of
jobs” for undocumented immigrants.68 Proponents of enhanced
employer sanctions assert that stiffer penalties and stronger
enforcement against employers would help eradicate exploitation of

61
62

63

64
65
66

67
68

See Calavita, supra note 56, at 1060; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 210–11.
Calavita, supra note 56, at 1060. Making compliance easy and less onerous
helped Congress to win the endorsement of IRCA’s employer sanctions by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which had previously opposed the measure. Id. at
1058–59. See also Wishnie, supra note 13, at 201–02 (describing the
compromise legislation that secured the support of the United States Chamber of
Commerce, AFL-CIO, and other groups that had initially opposed employer
sanctions).
Calavita, supra note 56, at 1042. Professor Calavita argues that the IRCA
legislative process resulted in the enactment of a law “that not only insulate[s]
offending employers from prosecution but in effect redefines them as
compliers.” Id.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1055, 1060.
Id. at 1060 (explaining how IRCA employer sanctions provisions ended up
becoming “symbolic” and “toothless”); see Wishnie, supra note 13, at 201
(noting the dependence of agribusiness on undocumented workers and their
concerns about the impact of employer sanctions).
Calavita, supra note 56, at 1065.
Id. at 1059; see Wishnie, supra note 13, at 195–96 (arguing that IRCA sought to
diminish “the strength of the ‘jobs magnet,’ deterring unlawful immigration, and
safeguarding wages and working conditions for U.S. workers.”).
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undocumented workers.69 However, contrary to this claim, the
problem is IRCA itself.
B. Employer Sanctions as Criminalization of Work
Whether and how the state intervenes or abstains is
expressed largely through legal rules and their
enforcement (or deliberate nonenforcement) and so
rests ultimately on its coercive power. Law is always
coercive . . . . Nor is the law neutral: its rules, at any
particular time, tend to favor to a greater or lesser
degree one or the other party in any given labor
relation.70
Just as Congress structured IRCA’s employer sanctions to afford
protection to employers, the Supreme Court has sided with employers
in delineating the rights of undocumented workers at the intersection
of IRCA and the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).71 Both
before and after the enactment of IRCA, the Court affirmed that
undocumented workers have a right under the NLRA to organize and
join unions.72 However, the Court also held in Sure-Tan and Hoffman
that undocumented workers, unlike other covered workers, are not
entitled to back pay—even when their employers illegally retaliate
against them for their organizing and union activities.73 And in
69

70
71

72

73

Editorial, No Crackdown on Illegal Employers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/opinion/no-crackdown-on-illegalemployers.html [https://perma.cc/UHA5-XSEQ]; see Wishnie, supra note 13, at
195 (arguing that the employer sanctions regime has made workplace
exploitation of undocumented immigrants more prevalent).
HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 26.
See infra text accompanying notes 91–123 (discussing the impact of Hoffman in
contributing to a discourse of criminalizing undocumented immigrant workers
and incentivizing unscrupulous employers to violate the NLRA).
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002)
(leaving undisturbed Sure-Tan’s holding that undocumented workers are
covered by the NLRA); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 892–93
(1984) (holding that the NLRA applied to protect undocumented workers
because there was no conflict with the Immigration and Nationality Act since, at
the time, Congress had neither made it unlawful for employers to knowingly
hire unauthorized workers nor made it a crime for undocumented workers to
accept employment).
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 149; Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at
903 (for purposes of back pay under the NLRA, “employees must be deemed
‘unavailable’ for work . . . during any period when they were not lawfully
entitled to be present and employed in the United States.”).
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Hoffman, where an employee who had presented false documents to
his employer was later illegally fired for joining a union, the Court
expressly relied on IRCA to reach this result.74 It found that the
N.L.R.B. had no authority to award back pay relief to an
undocumented worker because such relief was foreclosed by IRCA.75
Hoffman was especially harmful in drastically altering the legal
terrain for undocumented workers.76 By depriving undocumented
workers of the right to back pay under the NLRA, Hoffman
empowered employers to violate the NLRA and other employment
laws with impunity for an entire class of workers. After Sure-Tan,
some circuit courts continued to enforce the right of back pay for
undocumented workers who had not been deported or removed from
the United States.77 These cases, however, were abrogated by
Hoffman. In addition, three months after the Hoffman decision, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) rescinded its
“Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to Undocumented
Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws.”78 The
rescission cast into uncertainty the availability of post-discharge back
pay and other monetary relief for undocumented workers who are
victims of discrimination.79

74
75
76

77

78

79

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 151.
Id. at 147–49.
Wishnie, supra note 13, at 212. Professor Wishnie explains that Hoffman
“overturned decades of decisions by state and federal courts and agencies by
exempting employers of undocumented workers from back pay liability.” Id.
See N.L.R.B. v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir.
1997); Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. N.L.R.B., 795 F.2d
705, 719–20 (9th Cir. 1986). But see Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 976
F.2d 1115, 1121–22 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that IRCA precludes employees
from receiving back pay for any period that they were not lawfully entitled to
work in the United States).
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NO. 915.002, RESCISSION OF
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (June 27,
2002),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html
[https://perma.cc/F8GD-N9J6] [hereinafter EEOC RESCISSION].
The EEOC did not determine that undocumented workers are ineligible for back
pay under federal discrimination statutes. It stated that it was reexamining its
position on the issue. Id.
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The EEOC Enforcement Guidance80 had concluded that
undocumented workers were entitled to all forms of monetary relief,
including post-discharge back pay.81 Like the Second Circuit in
A.P.R.A. Fuel82 and the Ninth Circuit in Local 12, Warehouse and
Office Workers’ Union,83 the EEOC had interpreted Sure-Tan’s
limitation on back pay to apply only to workers who no longer
remained in the United States.84 The EEOC also determined that IRCA
did not preclude back pay awards to undocumented workers in federal
discrimination lawsuits.85 Given the EEOC rescission and lack of
controlling case law86 on this very issue, the uncertainty whether
undocumented workers who face discrimination will be treated the
same as other victims of discrimination is extremely troubling.

80

81

82
83

84
85
86

U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (Oct. 26, 1999),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc.html [https://perma.cc/4XZ7-4CSN]
[hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE].
Id. (explaining that undocumented workers are eligible for damages, back pay,
and attorney’s fees—with the narrow limitation that an undocumented worker
would be ineligible for back pay relief only if she or he was no longer in the
United States).
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d at 54.
Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. N.L.R.B., 795 F.2d 705,
719–20 (9th Cir. 1986).
EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 80.
Id.
See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (barring
employer from seeking discovery of workers’ immigration status in a Title VII
suit). The Ninth Circuit distinguished the NLRA from Title VII in explaining
why it was doubtful that Hoffman controls on the issue of back pay for
undocumented workers in Title VII suits. Id. at 1066–68. However, the Ninth
Circuit did not decide this issue. Id. at 1069. See also De La Rosa v. N. Harvest
Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238–39 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that due to the
difference between a court’s authority under Title VII and that of the N.L.R.B.
under the NLRA, it was not ready to conclude that Hoffman controlled in the
Title VII context). De La Rosa concerned the discovery of immigration status in
a suit alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII, and state
labor laws, thus the Court did not decide the issue of post-discharge back pay in
the context of Title VII. Id. But see Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp.
2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that undocumented workers were barred
by Hoffman from receiving back pay in Title VII suits).
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The outcomes in Sure-Tan and Hoffman condone inequality and
exploitation.87 These cases shift the incentive structure of the NLRA in
favor of unscrupulous employers and solidify the unequal status of
undocumented workers. Justice Breyer stated in his dissent in
Hoffman:
Without the possibility of the deterrence that backpay
provides, the Board can impose only future-oriented
obligations upon law-violating employers—for it has no
other weapons in its remedial arsenal. And in the
absence of the backpay weapon, employers could
conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least
once with impunity.88
Thus, law-breaking employers can profit from terrorizing and
exploiting workers, and crushing worker resistance.
Worse, employers can strengthen their coercive power by
simultaneously leveraging labor and immigration laws.89 Take the case
of an employer who uses IRCA’s I-9 to retaliate against undocumented
workers who organize. Although this practice unquestionably
constitutes an unfair labor practice, the employer would neither have
to reinstate the undocumented workers nor compensate them for back
pay. By law, the employer suffers no meaningful labor liability for
violating the law twice by using IRCA to bust unions.90
An equally harmful aspect of Hoffman is the Court’s discourse of
criminalizing work for undocumented workers—a discourse that
erases the illegal conduct of employers, despite the intention of IRCA
to focus on employers rather than workers.91 Congress elected not to
impose criminal sanctions on undocumented immigrants for working
without authorization.92 The Court in Hoffman, however, rationalized
the denial of back pay by relying on the IRCA provisions that penalize
the use of fraudulent documents for obtaining employment.93 In
87

88
89
90
91
92

93

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002); SureTan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 906 (1984).
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 154 (citations omitted).
Griffith, supra note 21, at 631–32.
Nessel, supra note 44, at 368.
Calavita, supra note 56, at 1049.
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 405 (2012); Palma v. N.L.R.B., 723
F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 2013).
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 148–49, 151.
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Hoffman, although Mr. Castro had been illegally fired by his employer
for joining a union, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
explained that Mr. Castro’s use of false documents during the I-9
process constituted serious illegal conduct that should not be condoned
by a back pay award.94
The Board had argued that IRCA did not make workers who used
false documents ineligible for back pay awards.95 Justice Rehnquist
rejected this argument and found that upholding the Board’s postdischarge back pay award would empower the Board “to award
backpay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed, for wages
that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the
first instance by a criminal fraud.”96
Significantly, the majority opinion never addresses that failure to
award back pay to Mr. Castro—unlawfully fired for exercising his
right of freedom of association—would condone serious illegal
conduct by his employer.97 Justice Rehnquist dedicates only two
sentences in the entire opinion, both occurring in the beginning,
regarding the employer’s retaliatory firing of Mr. Castro and three coworkers for supporting a union.98 The law-breaking employer
disappears from view, and the exclusive focus is Mr. Castro’s unlawful
immigration status and his use of a false work document.99 For the
majority, the “real criminal” is Mr. Castro, not Mr. Castro’s
employer.100
The
comments
94
95
96
97

98
99

100

Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
The majority opinion notes the employer will not “get[] off scot-free”—he will
still be subject to a cease and desist order, and he will be required to post a
notice at the worksite about employee rights under the NLRA. Id. at 152.
Id. at 140.
See Nessel, supra note 44, at 367–68 (explaining that the limited back pay
award to undocumented workers for a retaliatory discharge in the Second
Circuit’s A.P.R.A. Fuel decision undermines both the NLRA and IRCA “by
focusing on the status of the wronged employee rather than on the wrongdoing
employer, the latter of which is the intended target” of both statutes); Maria L.
Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need: Undocumented Workers’ Rights and
Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 607, 616 (1994)
(criticizing the focus on workers’ immigration status rather than employers’
illegal behavior).
See Calavita, supra note 56, at 1043–44 (citing to research attributing the often
lenient treatment that “white collar offenders” receive to “the attitude of law
enforcers that these are not ‘real’ criminals . . . .”). Professor Calavita draws on
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from Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy during oral argument
evinced concerns that employers are the victims of (1) immigrant
workers who break immigration laws and who, after termination, can
make use of their unlawful status to avoid the duty to mitigate back
pay damages by arguing that they cannot lawfully work in the United
States, and (2) of unions that knowingly organize undocumented
workers.101
It might be plausibly argued that Mr. Castro’s employer would not
have hired Mr. Castro had he known of Mr. Castro’s use of false
documents.102 Yet this possibility should not erase the fact that Mr.
Castro’s employer violated the NLRA. Further, the majority opinion
neglects to distinguish Mr. Castro’s employer, who did not know of
Mr. Castro’s undocumented status when he hired and fired him, from
employers who intentionally violate both IRCA and the NLRA.103
Thus, the outcome would be no different for an undocumented
immigrant worker whose employer “knowingly” hired her,
intentionally violated IRCA by disregarding the I-9 requirements, and
later used the I-9 as a pretext for a retaliatory firing. By elevating the
illegal conduct of workers who use false documents over the illegal
conduct of employers who simultaneously violate immigration and
labor laws, the Court’s discourse in effect “criminalize[s] work for the
workers themselves,”104 shifting attention and blame away from lawbreaking employers. Although IRCA on its face does not criminalize

101

102
103
104

this research to support her conclusion that IRCA’s employer sanctions
provisions were “written so as to label all but a handful of the most blatant
violators as ‘compliers.’” Id. at 1045.
Ellen Dannin, Hoffman Plastics as Labor Law–Equality at Last for Immigrant
Workers?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 393, 400–02 (2009) (containing an excellent
deconstruction of the comments and questions of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Kennedy at oral argument in Hoffman). Dannin details Rehnquist’s concerns
about rewarding immigrants who have broken the law by entering illegally,
Scalia’s concerns about whether undocumented workers could legally mitigate
damages given their status, and Kennedy’s concerns about whether unions are
violating public policy by organizing undocumented workers. Id. Dannin notes
that this approach shifted the blame to the immigrant worker and viewed the
employer as the victim. Id. at 400.
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 141.
Id. at 141–42, 148.
Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 86 (“In fact, punishing employers, or
threatening to do so, was always simply a mechanism to criminalize work for
the workers themselves, and thereby force them to leave the country, or not to
come in the first place.”).
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undocumented immigrants for working without authorization, there is
a de facto criminalization of undocumented workers.105
This incongruity in the majority’s analysis was not lost upon
Justice Breyer. In his dissent, Justice Breyer acknowledged the
particularly “perverse economic incentive” in favor of unscrupulous
employers “[w]ere the Board forbidden to assess backpay against a
knowing employer—a circumstance not before us today.”106 However,
he noted that even if the majority rule applied only to employers who
did not knowingly hire unauthorized workers, undocumented workers
as a class would be harmed because unscrupulous employers would be
incentivized to take the risk of hiring undocumented workers and of
violating their labor rights.107
Just as important, Justice Breyer rejected the majority’s focus on
worker criminality, noting that the narrative of “unlawfully earned
wages and criminal fraud . . . tell us only a small portion of the
relevant story.”108 Rather, he explained, a back pay award would
require an employer who violated the NLRA to compensate a worker
whom the employer believed was authorized to work: “(1) for years of
work that he would have performed, (2) for a portion of the wages that
he would have earned, and (3) for a job that the employee would have
held—had that employer not unlawfully dismissed the employee for
union organizing.”109
Post-Hoffman, two N.L.R.B. administrative law judges used
Justice Breyer’s distinction between “knowing” and “unknowing”
employers to preserve a right of back pay for some undocumented
workers.110 The judges in Imperial Buffet and Mezonos found that
105

106

107

108
109
110

See Griffith, supra note 21, at 618; Nessel, supra note 44, at 368; Wishnie,
supra note 13, at 193–94.
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
See id. at 156 (“But even if limited to cases where the employer did not know of
the employee’s status, the incentive may prove significant . . . the Court’s rule
offers employers immunity in borderline cases, thereby encouraging them to
take risks, i.e., to hire with a wink and a nod those potentially unlawful aliens
whose unlawful employment (given the Court’s views) ultimately will lower the
costs of labor law violations.”).
Id. at 160.
Id.
Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., No. 22-CA-27468, 2009 WL 2868889, at *56, *63
(N.L.R.B. Sept. 4, 2009); Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., No. 29-CA-25476,
2006 WL 3196754, at *13–14 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 1, 2006).
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undocumented workers could recover NLRA back pay if they had not
violated IRCA and their employer was a “knowing” employer.111
IRCA regulations define a “knowing” employer as one who possesses
actual or constructive knowledge that an employee or prospective hire
is unauthorized to work.112 “Knowing” employers include those who
fail to comply with the I-9 requirements or fail to do so within
statutorily-mandated time frames; who improperly complete the I-9
form with intent or recklessness; who disregard information indicating
a lack of authorization to work; who selectively target workers for
verification or selectively time the demand for verification; who accept
documentation that does not reasonably appear to be genuine; or who
make I-9 verification requests for an illegitimate purpose, such as
retaliation.113
Imperial Buffet and Mezonos reasoned that denying back pay
liability in the circumstance of a knowing employer who has violated
IRCA, where a worker has not done so, would reward employers for
intentionally violating both IRCA and the NLRA.114 The risks of such
illegal employment practices would fall entirely on workers instead of
their law-breaking employers.115 However, this win for workers was
short-lived. The N.L.R.B. reversed the ALJ’s decision in Mezonos,
finding that Hoffman categorically precludes back pay awards to
undocumented workers even when it is the employer, and not the
worker, who violates IRCA, because in either instance, the
employment relationship is unlawful.116 The Second Circuit affirmed
111

112

113

114

115
116

Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., 2009 WL 2868889, at *63; Mezonos Maven
Bakery, Inc., 2006 WL 3196754, at *16.
8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(l)(1). Constructive knowledge is defined as “knowledge
which may fairly be inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances
which would lead a person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to know”
that a prospective employee is unauthorized to work. Id.
See id. § 274a.1(l); Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., 2009 WL 2868889, at *39;
Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 2006 WL 3196754, at *11.
Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., 2009 WL 2868889, at *61 (citing A.P.R.A. Fuel
Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 415 (1995), abrogated by Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. 137); Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 2006
WL 3196754, at *15–*16.
Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 2006 WL 3196754, at *16.
Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 377 (2011). However, in a
supplemental decision the N.L.R.B. found that conditional reinstatement is an
appropriate remedy where a knowing employer discharges an undocumented
worker in violation of the NLRA. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B.
360, 362 (2015).
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the N.L.R.B.’s denial of back pay in Palma v. N.L.R.B.,117 thus closing
the window for back pay for undocumented workers under the NLRA.
At stake in Hoffman is not only a set of legal rules but also a
discourse or “use of language delineating a community and its
interests.”118 According to Professor Lori Nessel, “IRCA upset the
already precarious balance of ‘membership and exclusion’ under the
prior immigration regime.”119 Hoffman’s discourse of criminalization
skews this balance dangerously further by sanctioning the inequality of
undocumented immigrant workers through denial of the right to back
pay. Unsurprisingly, Hoffman and its progeny have emboldened
employers to aggressively use the law to disqualify undocumented
workers from protections under wage and hour laws, health and safety
standards, anti-discrimination laws, workers compensation, and even
state personal injury claims.120
117
118

119
120

Palma v. N.L.R.B., 723 F.3d 176, 185 (2d Cir. 2013).
JAMES D. SCHMIDT, FREE TO WORK: LABOR LAW, EMANCIPATION, AND
RECONSTRUCTION, 1815–1880, at 4 (1998) (quoting Kathleen Brown, Good
Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in
Colonial Virginia 5 (1996)). Schmidt explains his approach in studying the
construction of different models of labor law in the North and South during
Reconstruction: “In trying to understand the state by exploring law, I have
envisioned law not so much as a set of legal rules but as a discourse or a
language.” Id.
Nessel, supra note 44, at 361.
NELP, WORKPLACE RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 6. See also supra text
accompanying notes 76–86 (EEOC recession of enforcement guidance on
remedies for undocumented workers) and infra text accompanying notes 121–23
(post-Palma efforts by employers to disqualify undocumented workers from the
right to minimum wage and overtime pay under FLSA). Some lower courts,
using Justice Breyer’s distinction between “knowing” and “unknowing”
employers, have preserved the right to recover back pay and future lost wages in
tort actions for undocumented workers who are injured on the job. See, e.g.,
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2006)
(finding that neither IRCA nor Hoffman precludes undocumented workers from
recovering compensation for lost earnings under state tort and labor laws for
work-related injuries); Guamamtario v. Sound Beach Partners, LLC., No.
FBTCV126023901S, 2015 WL 467234, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2015) (holding
that undocumented workers not precluded from lost wage claims in personal
injury action, although evidence of immigration status may be relevant to issue
of damages); Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., 73 N.E.3d 663, 668–70 (Ind. 2017)
(finding that decreased earning capacity claims under state tort law not
preempted by IRCA or Hoffman but noting a trend of courts finding that
immigration status is relevant to calculation of lost earnings, subject to an
analysis of unfair prejudice); Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994,
1000–01 (N.H. 2005) (imposing liability on knowing employers for lost wages
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For example, after the Palma decision in 2013, employers
immediately challenged anew the right of undocumented workers to
recover wages and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) and state labor laws.121 These challenges occurred despite a
long line of precedent before and after Hoffman that strongly
established the right of undocumented workers to recover wages owed
for work performed.122 Fortunately, these efforts have been
unsuccessful.123 Yet they are a reminder that the stability of long-

121

122

123

in tort action does not conflict with IRCA’s policies); Balbuena v. IDR Realty
LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006) (allowing undocumented workers
back pay remedy in personal injury case involving violation of state labor law);
Macedo v. J.D. Posillico, Inc., 68 A.D.3d 508, 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
(holding that an undocumented worker did not forfeit right to lost wages in
personal injury action even though he used a false social security card because
this did not induce his employer to hire him since the employer did not comply
with IRCA in good faith); Coque v. Wildflower Estates Developers, Inc., 58
A.D.3d 44, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (citation omitted) (“[T]he employee is not
precluded, by virtue of his submission of a fraudulent document to the employer,
from recovering damages for lost wages as a result of a workplace accident.”);
Grocers Supply, Inc. v. Cabello, 390 S.W.3d 707, 723–24 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012)
(finding that Texas tort law was not preempted by IRCA or Hoffman in suit
brought by motorist who was undocumented migrant).
See Rosas v. Alice’s Tea Cup, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d 4, 8–9 (S.D.N.Y. 2015);
Akin v. Anion of Greenlawn, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 239, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2014);
Kim v. Kum Gang, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 6344(MHD), 2014 WL 2510576, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2014); Colon v. Major Perry St. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d 451,
456 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See also Vallejo v. Azteca Elec. Constr., Inc., No. CV–
13–01207–PHX–NVW, 2015 WL 419634, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2015);
Bautista Hernandez v. Tadala’s Nursery, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1246–47
(S.D. Fla. 2014).
See, e.g., Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2013); Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2013);
Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 706 (11th Cir. 1988); Flores v. Albertsons,
Inc., No. CV0100515AHM(SHX), 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9,
2002); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1058 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Montoya v. S.C.C.P. Painting Contractors, Inc., 530 F.
Supp. 2d 746, 750 (D. Md. 2008); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Almanza v. Baird Tree Serv. Co., No. 3:10–CV–311, 2012
WL 4026933, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2012).
But see Bermudez v. Karoline’s Int’l Rest. Bakery Corp., No. CV 12–
6245(LDW)(GRB), 2013 WL 6146083, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013)
(permitting employer discovery of immigration status in a FLSA action on the
theory that Palma calls into question whether undocumented workers may bring
FLSA claim to recover owed wages), declined to follow by Rodriguez v. Pie of
Port Jefferson Corp., 48 F. Supp. 3d 424 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that
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settled precedent protecting undocumented workers is jeopardized as
employers continually use their victories in Hoffman and its progeny to
chip away at these protections. For undocumented workers, deepening
exclusion and inequality loom as incessant threats.
C. Less Equal and Less Free
The IRCA employer sanctions regime and Hoffman and its
progeny have “consigned millions of undocumented workers to the
underground economy . . . as employers use the law . . . to intimidate
and retaliate against workers . . . .”124 If workers do not have a right to
reinstatement and back pay, employers are empowered to crush worker
dissent with little accountability.125 Scholars and immigration experts
note that IRCA and Hoffman have deterred immigrant workers from
contacting government agencies to complain about unlawful employer
activity, regardless of how severe the exploitation.126 Given the risk of
a retaliatory firing or an employer tip to ICE, the stakes for
undocumented workers who try to enforce their labor and employment
rights are extremely high.127 IRCA has created a structure in which
employers can fend off sanctions and fines while workers are made
more vulnerable to exploitation, deportation, and even criminal
prosecution.128
The result for undocumented workers is greater poverty,
inequality, and immobility. The concrete workings of employer
sanctions and Hoffman are lived by low-wage workers in complex
ways as they try to exercise agency in an economic system that gives
them little power.129 Sometimes IRCA makes finding work harder and

124
125
126
127
128

129

undocumented workers who filed a FLSA action could not be compelled to
respond to interrogatories concerning their immigration status).
NELP, WORKPLACE RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 6.
Wishnie, supra note 13, at 215–16.
Id. at 213; Griffith, supra note 21, at 630–31.
Saucedo, supra note 21, at 310.
Id. at 308–10, 320–21. Saucedo notes that few of the I-9 worksite audits of
employers conducted under the Obama Administration resulted in protecting
workers from exploitative employers. Id. at 307–08. She explains that employers
rarely faced serious consequences from the I-9 worksite audits; on the other
hand, the stakes for undocumented workers escalated because in addition to
immigrants facing civil immigration violations, prosecutors also brought
criminal charges against workers for identity theft, document fraud, or
presenting false documents to employers. Id. at 308–09.
See Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1223 (2008) (cautioning against a deterministic view of
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for that reason, undocumented immigrants will accept work despite
how poor the conditions are.130 Yet employers also have a strong
incentive to hire undocumented workers over citizen workers because
Hoffman and its progeny render undocumented workers more
vulnerable and exploitable.131 Further, to avoid competitive
disadvantage, scrupulous employers also feel constrained to hire
undocumented workers.132 Widespread abuse and exploitation cause
some undocumented workers to feel trapped and to refrain from
quitting their jobs in search of alternative employment.133 The
increased “freedom” of employers to exploit undocumented workers
makes it harder for workers to escape from unlawful working
conditions. In this way, the right to quit and right to mobility are
undermined.
Professor Maria Ontiveros, in arguing for the Thirteenth
Amendment as a source of migrant worker protections, points out that
the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Williams134 singled out the right to
change employers as central to preserving free labor.135 Increasing
numbers of scholars conclude that IRCA and Hoffman create a caste of
legally exploitable workers that recalls the institution of slavery and its
aftermath.136 Some argue that denial of effective remedies for

130

131

132
133

134
135

136

African American and Latino workers, and explaining that both groups of
workers “exercise a great deal of agency in the low-wage context” despite “their
relative powerlessness in the economic structures in which they labor”).
See Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 81; Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at
1220 (discussing support of families in native countries as one reason why
undocumented migrants would be unwilling to decline work or to protest
workplace abuses).
Calavita, supra note 56, at 1052–53; Nessel, supra note 44, at 350; Wishnie,
supra note 13, at 213.
Wishnie, supra note 13, at 214.
PETER KWONG, FORBIDDEN WORKERS: ILLEGAL CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND
AMERICAN LABOR 173–74 (1997); Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1164.
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
Ontiveros, Migrant Labour, supra note 18. Ontiveros quotes the Court in
Pollock v. Williams to explain the importance of the right to change employers
as central to maintaining a system of free and voluntary labor: “[T]he undoubted
aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Anti Peonage Act was
not merely to end slavery but . . . to maintain a system of completely free and
voluntary labor . . . [I]n general, the defense against oppressive hours, pay,
working conditions or treatment is the right to change employers.” Id. at 17.
Id. at 18; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 216. See Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at
94–95, 95 n.129 (discussing the connection between institutionalized racism and
immigration enforcement as contributing to a modern “social caste system”); see
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infringements of the workplace rights of undocumented workers
violates the Thirteenth Amendment as undocumented workers are
coerced into working below the floor for free labor.137
The corrosive effects of IRCA and Hoffman reverberate beyond
undocumented workers because United States citizens and other
legalized workers in low-wage jobs are made less free as well. An
employer gains the upper hand over citizen and legalized immigrant
workers by manipulating IRCA and violating the NLRA rights of
undocumented workers.138 The unequal status of undocumented
workers damages the ability of citizen and legalized workers to more
effectively organize by including undocumented workers when
employers wield IRCA as a union-busting tool.139 Cross-racial worker
solidarity becomes that much more difficult to achieve.140
Labor organizers maintain that IRCA’s “good faith defense”
loophole, and the Sure-Tan and Hoffman decisions, empower
employers to use the I-9 verification requirement to bust unions.141
When an employer uses the I-9 process to intimidate or fire
undocumented workers who support the union, the union is weakened
because citizen and legalized immigrant co-workers are left more
isolated and vulnerable as well.142 The right of freedom of association

137
138

139

140
141

142

also KWONG, supra note 133, at 174 (describing the impact of IRCA in pushing
undocumented workers “further down into a sub-class of American society” and
noting that one labor advocate has referred to IRCA as a “slave law”).
Ontiveros, Migrant Labour, supra note 18.
Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 88–89, 91. See NELP, WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON
ICE, supra note 51, at 13–14, for examples of cases in which employers use
IRCA to crush unionizing efforts, thus preventing workers from asserting their
rights collectively regardless of immigration status.
See David Bacon, Common Ground on the Kill Floor: Organizing Smithfield,
LABOR NOTES (Apr. 20, 2012), https://labornotes.org/blogs/2012/04/commonground-kill-floor-organizing-smithfield
[https://perma.cc/4QG7-H9FB]
[hereinafter Bacon, Common Ground]; Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 89. See
Chan, supra note 55, for a discussion of an I-9 audit that appeared to target
union supporters just before an important union election, thus hurting the ability
of all the workers at the worksite to form a union regardless of their immigration
status.
Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1233.
Meeting Minutes of the Chinese Staff and Workers Association, “Break the
Chains” Discussion, N.Y.C., N.Y. (July 30, 2017) (on file with author); see
Chishti & Kamasaki, supra note 55, at 3; see also EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO &
REBECCA SMITH, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON ICE:
CALIFORNIA REPORT 4 (2013) [hereinafter NELP, CALIFORNIA REPORT].
See Bacon, Common Ground, supra note 139.
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of all workers at a workplace—regardless of immigration status, race,
or ethnicity—is undermined when an employer re-verifies documents
to block reinstatement of workers who were illegally fired because
they backed the union.143 Consequently, IRCA has weakened the
ability of unions to organize and to defend their members.144
The misuse of the I-9 form by employers during labor disputes,
and other employer manipulations of immigration enforcement
activities are recognized by the United States Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) and labor agencies.145 The 2011 Revised
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between DHS and the
United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) and its Addendum146 in
2016 seek to insulate immigration-related worksite laws and labor
enforcement from “inappropriate manipulation” by employers and
their surrogates.147 According to the MOU and its Addendum, DHS
agrees to refrain from immigration worksite enforcement activities at
any workplace where there is an investigation of a labor dispute by the
DOL, N.L.R.B., or EEOC.148 This includes DHS refraining from
conducting I-9 audits at such worksites.149 Further, DHS agrees to
“thwart attempts by other parties to manipulate its worksite
143

144
145

146

147
148
149

Meeting Minutes of the Chinese Staff and Workers Association, supra note 141;
see also NELP, CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 141, at 4, 8–9 (explaining how
employers use I-9 reverification to undermine union organizing drives).
Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 89.
See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF LABOR, REVISED MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES
(2011),
https://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/dhs-dol-mou.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6H23-DADC] [hereinafter MOU] (establishing a process for
ensuring that worksite enforcement of immigration laws does not interfere with
labor law enforcement, and for thwarting employers and others from
inappropriate manipulation of immigration worksite enforcement to retaliate
against workers).
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF LABOR, ADDENDUM TO REVISED
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
AT
WORKSITES
(2016),
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-4684/dolice_mou-addendum_w.nlrb_osha.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SPE-7SH2] [hereinafter
MOU ADDENDUM] (extending the 2011 MOU to include the N.L.R.B. and
EEOC as parties to the agreement).
See MOU, supra note 145.
MOU ADDENDUM, supra note 146.
NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, IMMIGRATION AND LABOR IN THE WORKPLACE:
THE REVISED LABOR AGENCY-DHS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, FACT
SHEET (2016), at 2.
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enforcement activities for illicit or improper purposes,” including
“retaliat[ing] against employees for exercising labor rights, or
otherwise frustrat[ing] the enforcement of labor laws.”150
The destructive impact of IRCA and Hoffman extends beyond
union-busting. The practical ability of citizen and legalized immigrant
workers in low-wage industries to enforce their workplace rights is
diminished as employers are incentivized by Hoffman to hire
undocumented workers.151 The threat that an employer can replace
citizen and legalized immigrant workers with undocumented workers
serves to pressure workers into laboring faster, longer, and cheaper in
order to compete with undocumented workers.152 Labor activists
emphasize that when undocumented workers are deterred by IRCA
and Hoffman from enforcing their rights, citizen and legalized workers
stand on weaker ground to insist on the minimum wage and overtime
pay, safe working conditions, reasonable working hours, and nondiscrimination;153 they are threatened with termination or retaliation if
“they don’t work like an undocumented.”154 As Professor Ontiveros
explains, they “either must accept similar employment conditions
themselves or go without employment.”155 The ability of citizen
workers in low wage industries to quit and find other employment
becomes harder, and their mobility, flexibility, and control are also
weakened.156 Thus, the targeting of undocumented workers is used to
150
151

152
153
154
155

156

MOU, supra note 145.
See NELP, CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 141, at 1 (concluding that the
ability of unscrupulous workers to use immigration status to exploit immigrant
workers “with impunity” will result in “all low-wage workers suffer[ing]
compromised employment protections and economic security”).
Meeting Minutes of the Chinese Staff and Workers Association, supra note 141.
Id.
Id.
See Ontiveros, Migrant Labour, supra note 18 (explaining the manner in which
employers use immigrant guest workers to degrade working conditions for
citizen workers).
See Angela Stuesse & Laura E. Helton, Low-Wage Legacies, Race, and the
Golden Chicken in Mississippi: Where Contemporary Immigration Meets
African American Labor History, S. SPACES (Dec. 31, 2013),
https://southernspaces.org/2013/low-wage-legacies-race-and-golden-chickenmississippi-where-contemporary-immigration-meets
[https://perma.cc/98J73X8R] (discussing the plight of U.S.-born workers remaining in the southern
poultry industry after the entry of immigrant labor). Although not speaking in
the context of IRCA, Stuesse explains that the presence of immigrant labor to
fully staff production lines made it much more difficult for citizen workers to
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discipline and control citizen and legalized immigrant workers in lowwage industries, undoubtedly resulting in greater numbers of lawless
and autocratic workplaces. The “working class as a whole” is harmed
by the criminalization of undocumented immigrant workers.157 The
outcome of IRCA and Hoffman and its progeny is to universalize
coercion, inequality, lack of freedom, and exploitation.
III. CRIMINALIZATION OF NON-WORK IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR
SOUTH AND BEYOND
The racial politics of immigration and labor are often used to stoke
hostility between low-income United States citizens—especially
African Americans—and immigrant communities. Perceived
competition for jobs between low-income citizens and undocumented
immigrants, and the racist stereotyping of African Americans as “lazy
workers” and of certain immigrants as “hard workers” are exploited by
mainstream media, opportunistic politicians, and employers as well.158
These stereotypes are internalized by workers and produce real
frictions. A strong social science scholarship reveals that many African
American workers in the South blame new Latino immigrants not only
for taking jobs, but also for being too docile, and thus responsible for
intensifying the pace of work and driving down wages.159 At the same
time, Latino immigrants blame African Americans for being lazy and
unwilling to be productive.160

157

158

159
160

quit and find work at the same or other poultry plants. Id. This helped to deprive
citizen-born poultry workers of flexibility and some control over their work
lives. Id. Her point is relevant in the context of IRCA as well.
I borrow this language from Professor Heather Thompson. Thompson, supra
note 10, at 716 (“[T]he national economy, and the American working class as a
whole, feel the reverberations of the post–civil rights sixties turn to mass
incarceration.”). Professor Thompson makes a similar point about the impact of
the punitive labor system adopted in the South after the Civil War—a system
that created effects that rippled beyond the large numbers of Black Americans
imprisoned by it. Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 181–84. See also Gordon & Lenhardt, supra
note 129, at 1163–66, 1171–79 (summarizing social science research
documenting tensions between African Americans and Latino workers and the
role of employer bias); Stuesse & Helton, supra note 156 (describing
stereotyping of African American and Latino workers in the poultry industry).
Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1171–72, 1226.
Id. at 1172.
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Perceptions between African Americans and Asian immigrants are
similarly pitched. Narratives of Asian immigrants as industrious, lawabiding “model minorities” from close-knit families are contrasted
with narratives of African Americans as lazy individuals from broken
homes that reject education and hard work.161 Asian immigrants who
become small business owners often reproduce in their workplaces the
racial hierarchies that exist in society-at-large.162
Ethnic and racial hierarchies also punctuate the relationship
between black immigrants and African Americans.163 Despite
experiencing discrimination in the United States based on their
161

162

163

See Kat Chow, ‘Model Minority’ Myth Again Used as a Racial Wedge Between
Asians
and
Blacks,
NPR
(Apr.
19,
2017,
8:32
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/
04/19/524571669/
modelminority-myth-again-used-as-a-racial-wedge-between-asians-and-blacks
[https://perma.cc/8FQJ-SYWD] (discussing use of the perceived success of
Asian Americans to downplay racism against African Americans and other
communities of color); Ann-Derrick Gaillot, Black-Asian Animosity is an
American
Tradition,
OUTLINE
(Apr.
6,
2017,
11:54
AM),
https://theoutline.com/post/1351/black-asian-conflict-beauty-supply
[https://perma.cc/H8QP-ZQNR] (comparing Asian model minority stereotype at
odds with stereotypes of African Americans as well as noting tensions between
Korean small business owners and African Americans); Jeff Guo, The Real
Reasons the U.S. Became Less Racist Toward Asian Americans, WASH. POST
(Nov.
29,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/29/the-real-reasonamericans-stopped-spitting-on-asian-americans-and-started-praisingthem/?utm_term=.980786731f5c [https://perma.cc/V6LZ-GW8A] (describing
the use of the Asian model minority narrative to shift the blame for African
American poverty); Christine Huang, The Toll of Historically Pitting Asians
Against
Blacks,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
30,
2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-toll-of-historically-pitting-asiansagainst-blacks_us_58d2b56ae4b062043ad4af1b [https://perma.cc/2D35-F9PP]
(pitting of Asians against African Americans dates back to the Civil War and
Reconstruction). See generally ELLEN D. WU, THE COLOR OF SUCCESS: ASIAN
AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MODEL MINORITY (2014).
See MIRIAM CHING YOON LOUIE, SWEATSHOP WARRIORS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN
WORKERS TAKE ON THE GLOBAL FACTORY 31–33 (2001); Gaillot, supra note
161.
See CANDIS WATTS SMITH, BLACK MOSAIC: THE POLITICS OF BLACK PANETHNIC DIVERSITY 10–12 (2014) (explaining how the influx of Afro-Latino,
Afro-Caribbean, and African immigrants have complicated what it means to be
“African American” or “Black”). Professor Watts Smith explains that examining
the interactions between black immigrants and African Americans is crucial for
understanding the conditions that can foster coalition work based on a “panethnic identity” as well as conditions that are likely to engender “interethnic
distancing and intraracial conflict.” Id. at 3–4.
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“blackness,” some black immigrants elevate their ethnic and
immigrant identities above their racial identity to distance themselves
from African Americans.164 Black Caribbean and sub-Saharan African
immigrants sometimes use the narratives of immigrant work ethic to
distinguish themselves from the stereotypes of laziness and criminality
ascribed to African Americans.165 Professor Mary Waters observes of
West Indian immigrants, “The more immigrant or ethnic the
immigrants are, the more likely they are to have access to jobs . . . and
the more likely employers are to prefer to hire them than native
minorities.”166 At the same time, some African Americans may fault
Caribbean and African immigrants as foreigners who fail to adequately
understand the profound consequences of historical and structural
racism on African American communities.167
164

165

166

167

See MARY C. WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT DREAMS
AND AMERICAN REALITIES 341–43 (1999) [hereinafter WATERS, BLACK
IDENTITIES]; Godfried Agyeman Asante, Becoming “Black” in America:
Exploring Racial Identity Development of African Immigrants 53–55, 58, 62–63
(Apr. 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Minnesota State University, Mankato)
(on file with Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for
Minnesota State University, Mankato); see also Kathy-Ann C. Hernandez &
Kayon K. Murray-Johnson, Towards a Different Construction of Blackness:
Black Immigrant Scholars on Racial Identity Development in the United States,
17 INT’L J. MULTICULTURAL EDUC. 53 (2015) (discussing the personal
positioning and re-positioning of identity from the perspective of foreign-born
Black women in the Academy). This article offers a nuanced discussion of the
complex processes and challenges of negotiating immigrant and racial identities
in the United States. Id. at 65. The authors speak of moving away from a model
of “mak[ing] a fixed choice between one ‘Black’ identity and another” toward
that of “complementary worldviews” and “hybrid consciousness.” Id. at 68.
See WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES, supra note 164, at 7, 332–35, 341–43; Asante,
supra note 164, at 30, 48, 55, 58, 62–63. See also Mary C. Waters et al.,
Immigrants and African Americans, 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 369, 372 (2014).
WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES, supra note 164, at 331; Waters et al., supra note
165, at 380 (noting evidence suggesting that “many employers prefer
immigrants—including black immigrants—to African Americans in lowerskilled jobs”); see also Hernandez & Murray-Johnson, supra note 164, at 63
(recounting experiences in which white colleagues expressed more positive
attitudes to Caribbean immigrants than to African Americans).
See Asante, supra note 164, at 49–50 (explaining that a majority of the African
interviewees in the study did not know about African American history prior to
coming to the United States); Hernandez & Murray-Johnson, supra note 164, at
65 (discussing how one author’s initial view of African Americans as not
working hard enough changed over time as she began to see the “historical and
present-day systematic racial inequities” at play in the United States).
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Clearly, there is a pressing need for educational efforts aimed at
giving different communities new ways of understanding one
another’s history in the United States to help workers surmount racism
and division.168 This Article suggests that shared ground between
African Americans and immigrants can be built from understanding
one another’s fraught relationship to freedom and coercion as workers.
The criminalization of work for undocumented immigrants shares
some similarities to the criminalization of non-work for freed Blacks
during and after Reconstruction. The shared reality is that both forms
of criminalization have propped systems of compulsion and coercion.
The criminalization of work for undocumented immigrant workers
has been used by employers as a coercive apparatus to keep
immigrant—and citizen workers—in their place.169 As a consequence
of IRCA, both groups of workers have been made less free to resist
exploitation and less free to search for better employment. The
targeting of one group has helped turn many working class workers
into captive workforces.
While not identical but resonant, a network of laws proliferated in
the South that “worked to restrict the free market in labor” of black
workers and contributed to their involuntary servitude between
Reconstruction and World War II.170 These laws formed the backbone
of a coercive apparatus that sought to push black men and women back
into forced labor, reinforced by restrictions on their mobility to seek
alternative employment.171 Criminalization of non-work or “the

168

169
170

171

Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1235–36 (explaining the critical
importance of new community and education programs that promote
conversations about race and immigration and “give each group insight into the
other’s experience and history with work in the United States” as “an essential
first step in the process of identifying shared ground”).
See supra Part II.C; Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 89.
Wiener, supra note 29, at 981. See generally Cohen, Involuntary Servitude,
supra note 8.
See W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 167–68
(1963); Wiener, supra note 29, at 985.
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condition of being unemployed”172 lay at the core of attempts to
establish a kind of re-enslavement of freed black men and women.173
Legislatures throughout the South enacted Black Codes from
1865–1867 as a state response to white claims that newly freed black
people had to be stringently controlled.174 Many white planters, raising
the fear that newly freed Blacks would refuse to work for them,
enlisted the state’s help in ensuring the availability of an exploitable
workforce.175 Laws governing vagrancy and labor contract
enforcement—used to compel Blacks to work by criminalizing
unemployment or the refusal to work—were prominent labor
provisions in the Black Codes.176 Additional laws were enacted to
undercut the ability of black workers to seek better employment by
punishing those who recruited black workers for jobs in other southern
states or in the North. These consisted of anti-enticement statutes that
prohibited an employer from “enticing” away another employer’s
laborers, and statutes that restricted agents who recruited black
workers across state lines.177
This mesh of laws—vagrancy, contract enforcement, antienticement, and emigrant-agent restrictions—prevailed in one form or
another in the South until World War II.178 Together, they constituted
172

173

174

175

176

177
178

White, supra note 7, at 674 (discussing vagrancy law as a function of labor
regulation and resting on “the criminalization of the condition of being
unemployed or holding illegitimate forms or circumstances of employment”);
see DU BOIS, supra note 171, at 166 (discussing the enactment of the Black
Codes as premised on the white belief that black men and women would not
work without compulsion).
See David. E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions
on Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781, 787–92
(1998) (discussing the Black Codes enacted after the Civil War to “prevent the
emergence of a free labor market”). “The more severe laws practically recreated
slavery for African-American agricultural workers . . . .” Id. at 787.
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 34 (describing southern calls for
laws to control black labor and to “require them to fulfill their contracts of
labour on the farms”); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See Bernstein, supra note 173, at 787, 790–92; White, supra note 7, at 679–81;
Wiener, supra note 29, at 973–74.
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, 30–31; Cohen, Involuntary Servitude,
supra note 8, at 34; White, supra note 7, at 680.
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33.
Id. at 35–36; White, supra note 7, at 680. As White explains, though some of
these laws were nullified or repealed by Reconstruction, they were amended or
resurrected as facially neutral laws. Id. See also Wiener, supra note 29, at 981.
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the legal infrastructure for white planters to abridge the mobility and
freedom of black workers,179 thus establishing a “compulsory free
labor system” to replace slavery.180
A. Criminalizing Non-Work: Vagrancy Statutes as Employer
Swords
The vagrancy statutes of the post-war South were designed to
ensure that white planters had cheap and exploitable labor. These laws
directly regulated black workers and aided white planters in their
efforts to maintain labor and racial control.181 Narratives of black men
and women as lazy or idle were used to lobby in support of laborcompelling laws.182 By criminalizing the status of being unemployed
or the refusal to work, vagrancy laws empowered sheriffs and police to
“round up”183 and arrest Blacks who did not have labor contracts.184
Those who were convicted of vagrancy could be hired out as laborers
to their former employers or to any employer willing to post bond or
pay their fine.185 Broad definitions of “vagrant” cast a wide dragnet.186
For instance, Alabama’s statute from 1866 defined “vagrant” as
179

180

181

182

183

184

185
186

Other laws that inhibited the free market in black labor included the criminal
surety system, “which permitted convicts to serve their sentences laboring for
private employers.” Wiener, supra note 29, at 981. Debt peonage was also used
to extract labor from individuals who owed a debt. Cohen, Involuntary
Servitude, supra note 8, at 32.
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 7, 11. Cohen describes the system
that was beginning to emerge at the close of the Civil War as a “compulsory free
labor system.” Id. at 11 (quoting William F. Messner, Black Violence and White
Response: Louisiana, 1862, 41 J. S. HIST. 19, 34 (1975)).
See id. at xiii–xiv (describing the Black Codes and laws enacted between the
1870s and 1910 as a reassertion of white hegemony over freed black men and
women).
See infra text accompanying notes 268–71 for discussion of racialized narratives
in support of criminalization.
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33–34, 47–50; Wiener, supra
note 29, at 981; see DU BOIS, supra note 171, at 173–75 (describing vagrancy
acts enacted in Virginia, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Alabama).
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 47; see DU BOIS, supra note 171,
at 167–71 (discussing examples of the requirement and impact of labor contracts
for black workers in various southern states).
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 34.
Id. at 47 (stating that the vagrancy statutes enacted in the former Confederate
states in 1865 or 1866 “defin[ed] vagrancy in sweeping terms”). See DU BOIS,
supra note 171, at 173–75.
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someone “having no visible means of support, or being dependent on
his labor, lives without employment, or habitually neglects his
employment . . . .”187 In 1903, Alabama’s new vagrancy statute was
further broadened—a vagrant was defined as “any person wandering
or strolling about in idleness, who is able to work, and has no property
to support him; or any person leading an idle immoral, profligate life,
having no property to support him . . . .”188
Regulating vagrancy operated in tandem with a system of
compulsory labor contracts. The Black Codes frequently required
black workers to enter into labor contracts, sometimes by a specific
date at the beginning of each year.189 Once a labor contract was signed,
contract enforcement laws kicked in to penalize workers who broke
their contracts, including criminal prosecution for breach of
contract.190 As William Cohen explains, “The contract system could
work only if there was some way of forcing Blacks to sign labor
agreements in the first place.”191 Vagrancy laws “served as a threat to
those who might hesitate to enter into labor contracts.”192 Cohen notes
that “[B]y the early twentieth century the vagrancy acts had become a
mainstay of the system of involuntary servitude.”193
However, the vagrancy statutes must be understood as more than
labor-compelling tools that coerced Blacks into working against their
will. They also functioned as labor-disciplining tools.194 The labor
shortages that resulted from black migration after emancipation gave
black workers a degree of bargaining leverage.195 As a result, white
187

188

189

190
191

192
193
194
195

Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 48; see DU BOIS, supra note 171,
at 173–75 (describing vagrancy statutes right after the Civil War).
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 48. Cohen states that the new
vagrancy laws adopted in southern states between 1890 and 1910 survived
largely intact into the 1960s. Id. at 48–49.
DU BOIS, supra note 171, at 168–71; Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note
8, at 42.
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 45.
Id. at 47; see Pete Daniel, The Metamorphosis of Slavery, 1865–1900, 66 J. AM.
HIST. 88, 93–95 (1979) (discussing the labor-disciplining function of vagrancy
laws and labor-compelling function of contract laws emerging from most postplantation societies, including the United States South).
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 49.
Id. at 50.
See Daniel, supra note 191, at 93–95.
See COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 15–16 (at least with respect to
the prompt payment of wages).

2019

Criminalizing Work and Non-Work

327

planters found themselves confronting a rising tide of black labor
militancy that threatened work stoppages and emigration.196 Against
this backdrop, southern legislatures enacted vagrancy laws to make
being unemployed a crime.197 By criminalizing non-work,
unemployment, or the refusal to work for a particular employer, the
vagrancy acts directly attacked the right of black workers to move
freely and mobility was crucial to asserting one’s freedom and
control.198 Laws restricting mobility arose because freed black men
and women were moving to better their wages and job conditions,
moving from one local employer—or planter—to another, moving
back and forth between types of work, moving to reunite their
families, and moving to find better opportunities for their children.199
Black laborers who wanted to resist by quitting to search for better
employment, rather than capitulating to exploitative and oppressive
employers, had to confront the specter of the vagrancy acts.200
“[T]raveling in search of a new job would leave them vulnerable to
arrest for vagrancy.”201 In effect, even temporary unemployment was
illegal, and black workers could thus be forced to remain with their
employers even after their labor contracts expired.202 The vagrancy
laws, by punishing those workers who dared to disobey the
compulsory contract labor system,203 aimed to make workers too
scared to leave.204 Racial control and labor repression were the desired
196
197

198
199
200
201
202
203
204

See id. at 14–16.
Kathy Roberts Forde & Bryan Bowman, Exploiting Black Labor After the
Abolition of Slavery, CONVERSATION (Feb. 6, 2017, 10:39 PM),
https://theconversation.com/exploiting-black-labor-after-the-abolition-ofslavery-72482 [https://perma.cc/4PX9-NSNF] (explaining that “vagrancy – the
‘crime’ of being unemployed,” was the most “sinister crime” enumerated in the
Black Codes, and “aimed at keeping freed people tied to their former owners’
plantations and farms”).
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 14, 30–31.
Id. at xvi, 14; see also Bernstein, supra note 173, at 783, 786.
See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 51–52.
Bernstein, supra note 173, at 787.
Id.
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 30–31.
See Wiener, supra note 29, at 982 (describing vagrancy as among the laws
limiting the mobility of southern black workers and the desires of the planter
class in making most black workers “too frightened to leave” so that they would
“remain in order to preserve the low-wage, labor-intensive system of
production”).
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results of undermining freedom and control through criminalizing nonwork.
Moreover, the use of vagrancy laws to criminalize non-work
rippled beyond the racial politics and political economy of the postCivil War South. The South’s system of “compulsory free labor”
helped shape some of the vagrancy statutes enacted in the North
during the late nineteenth century to control unemployed or underemployed white low-wage workers.205 By the 1880s, modern vagrancy
statutes regulating white workers had become widespread in the
North.206 Whether regulating beggars in cities or harvest workers in
the Great Plains, the coercive and disciplinary functions of northern
vagrancy laws enacted around the time of the Black Codes and
afterwards were evident.207
Northern vagrancy statutes against begging—enacted between
1866 and 1885 in urban areas—subjected people who begged to
punishments such as arrest, imprisonment, and forced labor.208 Ablebodied persons prosecuted for begging were sentenced to “compulsory
labor” in prisons or local workhouses.209 Proponents of these laws
harnessed a narrative in support of criminalization that derogatively

205

206
207

208
209

See Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars Can’t Be Choosers: Compulsion and Contract in
Postbellum America, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1265, 1272–74 (1992) (noting how
northern charity reformers sought to compel able-bodied beggars to work by
outlawing vagrancy to combat what they perceived as idleness). Professor
Stanley explains that most of the people prosecuted under the vagrancy statutes
were subsistence-wage workers, who were always on the brink of poverty, and
passed back and forth between wage labor and begging. Id. at 1269. Professor
Stanley argues that the coercive aspects of the South’s reconstructed labor
system “were carried back north” by northern charity reformers who had
traveled extensively in the South, studying the transition from slavery to free
labor. Id. at 1288. Professor Stanley maintains that these northern reformers
were “[s]haped by their southern experience” and returned North to support
vagrancy laws to outlaw begging and to compel beggars into work. Id. See also
White, supra note 7, at 717–30 (describing the labor-disciplining functions of
vagrancy acts in North Dakota during the first few decades of the twentieth
century to undercut harvest workers who wanted to hold out for better wages
and working conditions).
White, supra note 7, at 681.
See id. at 684–85 (discussing scholarly studies documenting the “laborregulating functions” of modern vagrancy laws and their impact on repressing
labor organizing and forcing workers into low-wage employment).
Stanley, supra note 205, at 1274.
Id. at 1273–74.

2019

Criminalizing Work and Non-Work

329

lumped beggars with vagabonds, vagrants, and “tramps.”210 According
to this narrative, the crime committed by persons who begged was that
they chose idleness over work; they disobeyed the rules of the
marketplace by rejecting work, and instead supported themselves by
deceiving, duping, or preying on the public.211 Their problem was that
they “lacked compulsion to work.”212
Yet individuals who genuinely looked for work could still be
arrested for vagrancy.213 Labor advocates objected to the vagrancy
laws as penal servitude because the laws violated one’s basic right to
travel in search of work and to ask for alms or support while doing
so.214 As with the southern vagrancy statutes, workers could be
deterred by vagrancy laws from quitting to look for better employment
because they could not lawfully support themselves in the interim by
asking for alms.215 Simply put, one could not choose to beg to avert
giving in to an exploitative or oppressive employer.216
Revealing the disciplinary function of the criminal laws against
begging, one report by charity reformers decried “[T]he existence of a
‘large class who make begging a trade . . . who will only do such work
and at such wages as suit them.’”217 The demographic reality of those
who begged belied the reformers’ narrative claims of idleness and
deceit.218 Most people begging for alms were low-wage workers—
especially domestic workers and laborers—who teetered between jobs
210
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212
213

214

215

216

217
218

Id. at 1270. “Tramp” was a pejorative term used to label people who were
unemployed and transient. Id.
Id. at 1270, 1272. Reformers held that wage laborers abided by the rules of the
marketplace; in contrast, “The beggar was a dependent person who neither
bought nor sold but preyed on others. The wage earner abided by the obligations
of contract; the beggar eluded them.” Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1274 (explaining that labor advocates argued that the criminal laws against
begging “violated the freedom of poor men honestly looking for work”).
See id. at 1281 (noting that a labor spokesman’s claim that it was free person’s
“irrevocable right to travel in search of work, and he should not be ‘enslaved in
the penitentiaries’ because he asked for alms along the way”).
Id. at 1274; see also White, supra note 7, at 677 (discussing vagrancy acts as
means for regulating labor relations).
Stanley, supra note 205, at 1282. Stanley explains that as a result of the
vagrancy laws, “[F]ree persons could not choose to beg instead of agreeing to
work for low wages.” Id.
Id.
Id. at 1269.
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that paid too little to live on and chronic unemployment resulting from
fluctuations in the economy.219 Low-wage workers passed back and
forth between the realms of working and begging.220 For the working
poor, begging could be a bridge to survival.221 But with vagrancy laws
criminalizing begging, low-wage workers were shorn of a crucial right
of control—i.e., determining when to work and under what
circumstances, and asserting an alternative means to survive.222 In this
way, criminalization helped perpetuate an employer-dominated labor
market based on a system of substandard wages and conditions.
The coercive power of criminalization was similarly brought to
bear on transient harvest workers in the Northern Plains during the
early 1900s.223 Here, vagrancy laws became a powerful weapon for
suppressing the labor radicalism of harvest workers who were joining
the ranks of the Industrial Workers of the World or its affiliate
unions.224 Professor Ahmed White explains that in North Dakota, local
officials, police, and employers used vagrancy law to force harvest
field hands into accepting prevailing wages, thus cutting off their right
to hold out for better wages.225 A harvest worker who came to town to
find work but who held out for better wages was a sure target for arrest
as a vagrant and risked going to jail or being run out of town.226 Union
and labor organizers in particular fell victim to arrest for vagrancy.227
Local officials and the police regarded them as outside “agitators” who
tried to drive up wages by getting harvest workers to withhold their
labor.228 Vagrancy law became an effective instrument of coercion to
219
220
221
222

223
224
225
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227
228

Id.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
See id. at 1281 (concluding that the vagrancy laws “revoked . . . [the] formal
right of free choice” – referring to the right “to choose when, for how long, and
for whom to labor”).
White, supra note 7, at 670.
Id. at 670–71, 699–709.
Id. at 716–17 (providing examples in various cities and towns in North Dakota
in which vagrancy law was used against field hands who sought to withhold
their labor for better pay).
Id. at 718–19. Importantly, “Vagrancy was measured not simply by idleness, but
by willingness to work at prevailing wages.” Id. at 717.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 727 (quoting a state employment bureau director’s complaint to police
“that ‘agitators’ were forcing up wages by causing laborers to ‘hold out’”).
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accomplish the twin goals of driving transient harvest workers into
low-wage employment and quashing unions and worker organizing.
The state, through criminalizing non-work—whether in the South
or North—handed tremendous power to employers to compel, control,
and discipline workers. Vagrancy law was used to clamp down on
workers who asserted their right to freedom, their right to search for
better employment, and their right to say “no” to their employers.229 In
the case of black workers in the post-Civil War South, vagrancy law
operated most perniciously by contributing to new forms of
compulsory labor as part of the South’s reconstructed labor system.230
B. Anti-Enticement Statutes: Swords Against Black Workers
Vagrancy laws in the post-Civil War South were complemented by
laws that restricted competition between white planters for black
workers.231 These consisted of anti-enticement and emigrant agent
laws.232 Whereas vagrancy law regulated black workers, these laws
targeted white behavior.233 However, the end goal was the same—the
private use of state power to rein in the freedom, mobility, and right of
control by black workers.
By imposing prohibitively high licensing fees, emigrant agent laws
aimed to outlaw labor brokers who recruited black workers for out-ofstate employment.234 These laws helped restrict large-scale outmigration.235 Without the financial assistance, backing, and
information about jobs supplied by labor brokers, migration by poor
rural Blacks became more arduous.236
The anti-enticement statutes warrant special interest because, like
IRCA, they regulated employer behavior.237 Employers who recruited
229
230
231

232
233
234

235
236
237

Id. at 716–17.
Id. at 679–81.
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the competition and
conflict between white planters who favored restricting black mobility and those
who favored the out-migration of black workers); Wiener, supra note 29, at 981
(“[E]nticement statutes, [] made it a crime for one planter to hire laborers
employed by another.”).
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33.
Id. at 42.
Bernstein, supra note 173, at 791–93; Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note
8, at 38–40.
Bernstein, supra note 173, at 782.
Id. at 781–82.
Id. at 791.
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another employer’s workers were subject to criminal prosecution for
enticement.238 These statutes made it a crime for an employer to “‘hire
away, or induce to leave the service of another,’ any laborer ‘by
offering higher wages or in any other way whatsoever.’”239 Antienticement laws sometimes functioned with the support of a system of
documentation verification.240 An employer who hired someone
without proof of a discharge certificate from his or her previous
employer could be prosecuted for enticement.241
Although regulating employers, the anti-enticement laws were
more anti-Black and anti-worker than anti-employer. No doubt
individual employers felt the teeth of these laws. But anti-enticement
boosted the rights of the class of employers who depended on black
workers. The anti-enticement laws created a right of security242 for
employers in black workers as property,243 as well as a right of
security in worker exploitation and oppression. An employer who
offered higher wages and better working conditions to someone
already under contract with another employer could be penalized more
harshly than an employer who mistreated his or her workers.244
Further, a laborer who left an employer to work for another employer
offering higher wages could be forcibly returned to his or her former
238
239

240

241

242

243

244

Id.; Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 35–36.
Wiener, supra note 29, at 974 (quoting Alabama’s and Georgia’s antienticement statutes); Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 35 (quoting
Georgia’s anti-enticement statute).
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 42 (describing the documentation
system in South Carolina, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas).
Id. See also HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 34 (explaining the British colonial
practice of requiring discharge certificates or testimonials from former
employers was a common way of putting an employer who might try to “poach”
another employer’s workers on notice).
The notion of the right of security is drawn from SCHMIDT, supra note 118, at 5.
Schmidt contrasts the right of workers to quit and the right of security for
employers in unbreakable, definite contracts that interfered with the ability of
workers to sell their labor freely. Id.
Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 35 (explaining that the
enticement acts “re-created in modified form the proprietary relationship that
had existed between master and slave”); see also Wiener, supra note 29, at 974
(describing informal agreements among white planters not to hire away one
another’s laborers because they saw black workers as “attached to the soil” and
planters “as much their masters as ever”).
See HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 34 (describing the implications of antienticement statutes under master and servant law throughout the British
colonies).
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employer.245 Employers wielded the threat of anti-enticement as a
weapon not only against other employers, but also against their
employees.246 Black workers who quit to find better employment were
harassed by their former employers with the threat of bringing charges
of enticement against each new employer.247
The anti-enticement laws sought to “turn off the spigot of jobs” for
black workers who asserted control by quitting for better employment.
More than a century later, IRCA would be predicated on the same idea
of “turning off the spigot of jobs” to illegalize the hiring of
undocumented workers.
IV. DRAWING PARALLELS: CRIMINALIZING WORK AND NON-WORK
A. Captive Workers: State Power and Employers
Prohibiting work and requiring work appear to be polar opposites.
Yet the modern-day criminalization of work for undocumented
immigrant workers shares important features with the post-Civil War
South’s criminalization of non-work for black workers. Both systems
of criminalization hand over state power to employers to control,
repress, and coerce workers.248 The result is similar: depriving workers
of the right to freely sell their labor and granting employers a
comprehensive power to exploit.249 State power becomes an employer
sword against workers.250 Law-breaking employers invoke IRCA’s
ban on the employment of undocumented workers and the I-9
verification apparatus to coerce workers into capitulating to illegal
working conditions.251 They brandish IRCA and threats of arrest,
detention, and deportation to rout undocumented workers who assert
control by protesting abuses, organizing unions, or filing complaints
with enforcement agencies.252 Analogously, southern planters invoked
vagrancy and contract labor laws to immobilize black workers from
245
246

247
248
249
250
251
252

Wiener, supra note 29, at 974.
See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 37 (providing examples in
North Carolina where anti-enticement was used by employers to threaten and
harass black workers who had quit or run away).
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 124–40, 195–202.
See supra Part II.C and text accompanying notes 170–80.
See supra text accompanying notes 44–47.
See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.
Wishnie, supra note 13, at 215–16.
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resisting exploitation and oppression, withholding their labor, or
quitting in search of better opportunities.253 Southern planters used
these laws on an as-needed basis to maintain a captive workforce when
it served their interests.254
Despite IRCA’s purported focus on employers, “turning off the
spigot of jobs” is deployed by employers to control and discipline
workers. IRCA deters many undocumented workers from quitting to
protest exploitation or discrimination because they are concerned that
it will be difficult to find alternative employment or better
employment.255 An employer’s threat to terminate enforces a similar
deterrent effect. So too, the post-Civil War anti-enticement statutes,
despite their focus on employers, were used to deprive black workers
of a right of access to alternative employment.256 Anti-enticement laws
helped perpetuate a status quo of racial and labor repression, and
inhumane working conditions.
Further, the perverse outcomes produced by the anti-enticement
laws are paralleled by the decisions in Sure-Tan and Hoffman. Under
anti-enticement laws, employers who offered better jobs were
punished as culprits rather than exploitative and oppressive employers;
under IRCA, Sure-Tan, and Hoffman, undocumented workers fare
much worse under state enforcement powers than exploitative
employers who break immigration and labor laws.257 Blame is shifted
from law-breaking employers to undocumented immigrant workers.
253
254

255

256
257

See supra text accompanying notes 189–93, 199.
See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33 (“[T]he system of
involuntary servitude that emerged after the Civil War was a fluid, flexible affair
which alternated between free and forced labor in time to the rhythm of the
southern labor market.”). Cohen explains that southern employers had the “tools
to compel labor” when labor was scarce; “[w]hen labor was plentiful,” they did
not need to resort to compulsion. Id.
See supra text accompanying note 130; see also Holloway Sparks, Queens,
Teens, and Model Mothers: Race, Gender, and the Discourse of Welfare
Reform, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 171, 178–81 (Sanford
F. Schram et al. eds., 2006).
See supra Part III.B.
See Brownell, supra note 47, at 73–74 (discussing low risk of fines on
employers who violate IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions and a “relatively
small share of [INS and ICE] enforcement resources on employer sanctions”);
Chishti & Kamasaki, supra note 55, at 5 (noting that funding for labor standards
enforcement stagnated after IRCA and declined from 2001–2009); NELP,
WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON ICE, supra note 51, at 10–11 (“[W]orkers themselves
have borne the punitive brunt of the employment sanctions regime.”); Nessel,
supra note 44, at 368 (noting that the NLRA back pay award is cheaper than
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Enforcement of both systems of criminalization relies on
verification of worker status, which becomes an instrument of control
in the hands of employers. IRCA’s I-9 requirement of proof of
authorization to work is leveraged offensively by unscrupulous
employers to intimidate undocumented workers.258 In a similar
manner, proof of certificates of employment and of discharge were
used to subject black workers who lacked these documents to arrest for
vagrancy or violation of contract labor laws, and the workers could
then be forcibly returned to their former employers or subjected to
compulsory labor with other employers.259
For undocumented workers, Sure-Tan and Hoffman confer on lawbreaking employers virtually untrammeled power to retaliate against
undocumented workers who organize.260 For black workers, vagrancy,
contract labor, and anti-enticement laws formed core components of a
legal infrastructure that granted unchecked power to white planters and
other employers.261
Whether criminalizing work or non-work, the consequence for
workers has been less equality, less freedom, and more coercion.
Douglas Hay and Paul Craven caution that erecting a “dichotomous
bright line between freedom and coercion . . . misleads about the
realities of both slavery and employment.”262 They state, “Coercion is
a complex continuum of forms and practices.”263 The legal treatment
of today’s undocumented immigrant workers and of black workers
after the Civil War underlines each group’s fraught relationship to
equality and freedom. Undocumented workers occupy a contradictory
status before the Supreme Court; they are simultaneously equal and
unequal in that they are protected under United States labor law but

258
259
260
261
262
263

unionization and thus insufficient to deter employer abuse); Saucedo, supra note
21, at 308 (explaining that IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions have “created
an employment structure in which employers set up mechanisms to protect
themselves from the sanctions and enforcement, and at the same time make
employees vulnerable to both immigration and non-immigration consequences
of working without authorization”). Saucedo explains that few of the Obama
Administration’s worksite I-9 audits of employers under IRCA resulted in
protecting workers against exploitative employers. Id. at 307–08.
See supra text accompanying notes 145–50.
See supra text accompanying notes 241, 245–46.
See supra text accompanying notes 88, 124–28.
See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33–34.
HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 28.
Id. at 27.
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denied the right to back pay to which other workers are entitled.264
Under IRCA it is not illegal for undocumented immigrants to accept
employment, but it is illegal for employers to hire them. Black
workers, too, occupied a contradictory status after the Civil War. The
legal restrictions on their mobility created a system of “compulsory
free labor”265 that placed them in a “twilight zone” between freedom
and slavery.266 For both undocumented and black workers, state action
has been as pivotal as private employer action in undermining
equality, freedom, mobility, and control.
B. Narratives in Support of Criminalization
Whether criminalizing work through IRCA or non-work through
vagrancy law, narratives of disobedience and disorder are harnessed to
rationalize criminalization. For undocumented workers, the narrative
focus is criminality. The emphasis on worker criminality in Hoffman
endorses the narrative of undocumented workers as law-breakers who
violate immigration laws, who defraud the public while duping
employers, and who rob United States citizens of jobs while cheating
other immigrants who play by the rules.267
264

265
266

267

See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 911–12 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the anomalous status of undocumented workers); see
also Motomura, supra note 60, at 1726 (referring to role of “pervasive national
ambivalence about immigration” in shaping evolution of rights of
undocumented migrants).
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 11.
Daniel, supra note 191, at 89, 98. See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note
8, at 33 (“[T]he system of involuntary servitude that emerged after the Civil War
was a fluid, flexible affair which alternated between free and forced labor in
time to the rhythm of the southern labor market.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 91–101 (discussing the emphasis in Hoffman
on the criminality of undocumented workers) and infra text accompanying note
273 (Justice Scalia’s comments at oral argument in Hoffman). See, e.g., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney Gen., Memorandum for all Fed. Prosecutors (Apr. 11,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download
[https://perma.cc/DXB9-JWSG] (directing federal prosecutors to seek charges of
aggravated identity theft against immigrants who use false documents). See also
Nessel, supra note 44, at 390–91 (refuting claims that granting temporary or
permanent work authorization for reporting workplace violations is a “reward
for lawbreakers”); Lauren Gilbert, The (Aristotelian) Rhetoric of Immigration
Reform (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2283731 [https://perma.cc/X23F4PC4] (discussing political rhetoric around immigration); Christopher Ingraham,
‘Go Home and Get in Line’: Fact-Checking Kris Kobach on DACA, WASH.
POST
(Sept.
7,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/07/go-home-and-get-
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Black workers in the post-Civil War South contended with a
different but overlapping narrative. Vagrancy laws rested on the claim
that black workers threatened the southern social and economic order
by their idleness and laziness.268 Northern reformers feared that newly
freed black men and women would irresponsibly exercise their new
freedom by rejecting work,269 and suggested that vagrancy law and
compulsory contracts were needed to school them “in the ways of the
market and the wage system.”270 These racist narratives of idleness,

268

269

270

in-line-fact-checking-kris-kobach-ondaca/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0d10a54be8d1
[https://perma.cc/DG58Q9BD] (debunking the claims that undocumented immigrants should get in line
and wait their turn); Miriam Valverde, Donald Trump’s Misleading Claims
About Immigration in State of the Union Address, POLITIFACT (Jan. 31, 2018,
6:20 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2018/jan/31/donaldtrumps-misleading-claims-about-immigration-/ [https://perma.cc/83UU-PM4H]
(analyzing Trump’s claims about immigrants taking jobs from the poorest
Americans, and labeling immigrants as terrorists and gang members);
Immigration 101: Why Can’t Immigrants Just “Get Legal”, [sic] “Get in Line”
and
Get
Their
Papers?,
AMS.
VOICE
(July
25,
2017),
https://americasvoice.org/blog/immigration-101-why-immigrants-cant-just-getlegal/ [https://perma.cc/5VL5-C847] (explaining the fallacy of “get-in-line”
arguments); Why Don’t They Just Get in Line?: There is No Line for Many
Unauthorized Immigrants, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/why-don%E2%80%99tthey-just-get-line [https://perma.cc/6FYN-F4TD].
See COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 14–15 (explaining how freed
Blacks’ rejection of the work forms of slavery and of “slavery’s hours and
slavery’s pace” was perceived by whites as “idleness and indolence and served
as confirmation that blacks needed white supervision”); Stanley, supra note 205,
at 1285 (quoting the Freedmen’s Bureau Chief as believing that “[I]dleness was
an intractable problem and neither persuasion nor threats overcame the
freedmen’s reluctance to make contracts.”).
See Stanley, supra note 205, at 1283 (“‘Freedom does not mean the right to live
without work at other people’s expense,’ the bureau declared in 1865.”). The
Bureau also proclaimed: “While the freedmen must and will be protected in their
rights, they must be required to meet these first and most essential conditions of
a state of freedom, a visible means of support, and fidelity to contracts.” Id.
Northern beggars, harvest workers, and transient people, too, were denounced as
idle and lazy outcasts who menaced society by rejecting work. Id. at 1276, 1282;
see also White, supra note 7, at 682–83 (social reformers referred to transient
people who traveled by railroad as “tramps” and saw them as “criminals, moral
degenerates, ethnic or genetic inferiors, and diseased outcasts who had either to
be removed from society or saved from themselves by the harshest of
policies.”).
See Stanley, supra note 205, at 1289 (describing the comments of the
Freedmen’s Bureau Chief).
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laziness, and personal irresponsibility continue to figure strongly
against African Americans in current policy debates. Perhaps most
notable is the stereotyping of African American women who receive
welfare assistance as lazy “welfare queens,” a dominant theme that
helped push welfare reform through the enactment of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.271
Further, some perceive only a thin line between idleness and
criminality. For example, one southern business owner decried, when
trying to break the strike of black and white miners, “‘Idleness’ . . .
‘always begets crime.’”272 For Justice Scalia, criminality also could
beget idleness. During oral argument in Hoffman, Scalia commented
that a “smart” undocumented worker would realize that he could
exploit his lack of work authorization status to avoid a duty to mitigate
back pay damages by arguing that he cannot lawfully work, and thus
“just sit home and eat chocolates” and collect back pay.273
The narratives of criminality and idleness, although distinct,
coincide. They identify disobedient outsiders who disrupt the social
order, and who, therefore, must be controlled.274 Policing the
“criminality” of undocumented workers and the “work ethic” of
African American workers has rested on the power of racialized
narratives that excite fear and invite division.275 These narratives of
“loafers” and “lawbreakers”276 have provided the pathos277 and
organizing principle for criminalization.
271

272

273

274
275

276

Sparks, supra note 255 (describing the racial politics of welfare reform and the
dominating narrative of African American women as abusers of the welfare
system).
Gerald Friedman, The Political Economy of Early Southern Unionism: Race,
Politics, and Labor in the South 1880–1953, 60 J. ECON. HIST. 384, 402 (2000).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00–1595). See Dannin, supra note 101, at
401 (analyzing Justice Scalia’s concerns about mitigation of damages at the oral
argument as “an argument to prevent a wily discriminatee from taking
advantage of a hapless employer” and viewing the inability to mitigate damages
through obtaining lawful employment as “essentially equivalent to or greater
than the employer’s original violation”).
See Stanley, supra note 205, at 1272.
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 15–16. See also Gilbert, supra note
267.
Sparks, supra note 255, at 183 (explaining that the dominating narrative of
welfare recipients as “loafers, lawbreakers, and immoral mothers” made it
difficult for poor women of color who were welfare recipients to participate in
the debate about welfare reform). Professor Sparks explains that non-citizens,
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C. The Rights of Other Workers
Criminalizing work and non-work share another crucial dimension:
labor repression and the race-to-the bottom resound beyond
“criminalized workers.” Employers have always been cognizant “that
the effect of a bounded sector under more coercive sanctions [is] to
depress wages in the wider labor market as well.”278 Broader groups of
workers are injured as employers use the criminalization of targeted
workers to fracture worker unity, to sow division between workers,
and to discipline workers, regardless of their citizenship or
immigration status.
The recognition that IRCA hobbles the ability of unions to defend
their members and to organize new members led the AFL-CIO to
reverse its support of IRCA and to call for its repeal in 2000.279
Organizers from independent worker centers and mainstream unions
alike lament that IRCA and Hoffman are potent tools for busting
unions and undermining the right of freedom of association.280 As
well, the criminalization of undocumented workers positions
employers to dismantle labor standards for broader groups of workers.
When undocumented workers are deterred from enforcing their rights
against illegal employer conduct, citizens and legalized immigrant
workers also have a harder battle enforcing their rights because they
are pressured by employers to compete with undocumented
workers.281 And enmity is stoked as employers appeal to racist

277

278

279

280
281

particularly those from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, were also portrayed as
cheating the welfare system. Id. at 181.
See Gilbert, supra note 267 (discussing the use of ethos (credibility of the
speaker), pathos (emotional state of the audience), and logos (internal logic of an
argument) in persuasion). Pathos rests on the use of emotion to stir an audience
for a particular goal. Id. Gilbert suggests that all three tools are used in
advancing xenophobia and restrictionist immigration policies. Id.
HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 32 (describing the purpose of master and
servant law and the characteristics of indentured labor and other forms of
bounded labor).
See Nancy Cleeland, AFL-CIO Calls for Amnesty for Illegal U.S. Workers, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/feb/17/news/mn-65389
[https://perma.cc/4AL9-NXXU]; AFL-CIO: End Sanctions, MIGRATION NEWS
(Mar.
2000),
https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2037
[https://perma.cc/H5HU-WBNB].
Wishnie, supra note 13, at 212–214.
KWONG, supra note 133, at 174; see also Wishnie, supra note 13, at 213–14;
supra text accompanying note 131.
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stereotypes of criminality and idleness to turn workers against one
another.282
Like IRCA, southern vagrancy laws could be used to break strikes
and unions. The planter class feared the biracial coalition of black
workers and poor white southerners.283 Other southern employers also
strived to defeat such coalitions with the help of elected officials and
law enforcement.284 One scholar provides an example from Alabama
in which striking black and white miners in 1908 had surmounted
racial division to maintain solidarity throughout their strike.285 When
other union-busting tactics fell short, the governor threatened to call
upon the legislature to amend the vagrancy laws to authorize the arrest
of striking black miners rendered “idle” by the strike.286
White workers could also seek to use vagrancy as a tool against
black workers whom they regarded as competitors who depressed
local wages.287 In such instances, vagrancy appeared to be an attempt
by white workers to drive black workers out of the local labor market.
For instance, white longshoremen in New Orleans, who had united
with black longshoremen to strike for better wages eight years earlier,
called upon law enforcement in 1873 to “arrest as vagrants the ‘low,
ignorant negroes, who slept under tarpaulins and in barrel houses, and
who . . . could afford to work at lower than regular rates.’”288 The

282

283

284

285
286
287
288

Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1177–78; Stuesse & Helton, supra note
156.
See STEVEN HAHN, THE ROOTS OF SOUTHERN POPULISM: YEOMAN FARMERS
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GEORGIA UPCOUNTRY, 1850–1890, at 204–
25 (1983) (discussing challenges of the Republicans in forging unity between
Blacks and white yeoman for electoral victories during Reconstruction).
See ROGER W. SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 301 (1968)
(describing how the unified strike of black and white longshoremen in 1865 for
increased wages most likely caused anxiety about the prospect of racial
solidarity in labor organizing); Friedman, supra note 272, at 402 (describing
Alabama governor’s anti-union tactics in support of mine owners against
striking black and white miners in 1908).
Friedman, supra note 272, at 402.
Id. at 402.
See SHUGG, supra note 284, at 301–02.
Id. at 302. Shugg explains that eight years after the black and white
longshoremen had led their joint strike in 1865, the racial animosity of white
workers had intensified and economic depression had exacerbated the
competition for jobs. Id. at 301–02.
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police complied and arrested as many black longshoremen as they
could.289
In both examples—Alabama and New Orleans—the use of
vagrancy as a weapon against black workers and biracial organizing
was accompanied by claims of white supremacy.290 But labor
repression in the service of white supremacy was used to bring down
the wages of unskilled white laborers as well, forcing both Blacks and
whites to work on terms dictated by employers.291 Evidence suggests
that the wage rates paid to black workers kept the bar low for white
workers, even when employers gave them preference.292 Often,
though, southern planters preferred black laborers to white laborers
because they perceived the latter as more demanding.293
Finally, as discussed earlier, the repressive function of southern
vagrancy laws broadened beyond black workers, as these laws became
a template for laws in the urban North and Northern Plains that

289
290

291

292

293

Id. at 302.
See id. (illustrating the racist statements made by white longshoremen seeking
the arrest of black longshoremen); Friedman, supra note 272, at 402–03 (“[The
Alabama governor] warned the union leadership that the [white] public was
‘outraged at the attempts to establish social equality between white and black
miners.’”).
See SHUGG, supra note 284, at 302 (discussing white longshoremen’s use of
vagrancy laws against black longshoremen and noting that competition between
black and white workers accrued to the benefit of employers in many sectors by
reducing the wages of “the unskilled, white or black”); Friedman, supra note
272, at 403 (discussing the appeals to white supremacy in breaking up striking
miners).
See JAMES L. ROARK, MASTERS WITHOUT SLAVES: SOUTHERN PLANTERS IN THE
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 165–66 (1977) (describing attempts by
southern planters to recruit white immigrant workers in order to discipline or
replace black workers). However, these attempts were largely unsuccessful
because immigrants chose cities in the North over the South and those who
stayed were “more expensive to feed and keep” than black workers. Id. at 167;
SHUGG, supra note 284, at 302–03 (“[Steamboat companies] decided to
discharge all Negroes and hire whites instead, but ‘at the same wages as are now
paid to black [workers].’”). Planters tried to recruit immigrant workers to the
South to threaten or replace black workers but often the immigrants refused to
remain in the South where they were treated similarly to black workers, and
instead went elsewhere for better opportunities. See id. at 254–59 (describing
attempted use of Chinese, German, and Irish immigrant workers in the South
and refusal of immigrant workers to remain in the South as cheap labor).
See HAHN, supra note 283, at 163.
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criminalized people who begged, and unemployed and underemployed people.294
V. CONCLUSION
Despite strong evidence that IRCA’s employer sanctions have had
a disastrous effect on low-wage workers and labor standards, repeal of
employer sanctions does not figure into immigration reform debates.
Proposals from both parties in Congress typically seek to enhance the
I-9 system of documentation rather than dismantle it.295 The question
faced by civil rights and immigrants’ rights communities, workers’
centers, trade unions, and other labor organizations is: what kind of
worldview or framework is necessary for achieving the long-term goal
of repealing employer sanctions? So long as IRCA is addressed only
as immigration policy, the prospects for repeal will remain nonexistent because the attendant discourse reduces to divisive narratives
of “insiders” and “outsiders” competing for jobs.296 The resultant
294

295

296

See supra text accompanying notes 205–30 (discussing vagrancy laws in the
North and Northern Plains).
RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42980, BRIEF HISTORY OF
COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM EFFORTS IN THE 109TH AND 110TH
CONGRESSES TO INFORM POLICY DISCUSSIONS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 19
(2013).
See, e.g., Paul Bedard, Expert: Amnesty, Illegal Immigration, Hits Black Wages
Hardest,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(Mar.
16,
2016,
5:56
PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/expert-amnesty-illegal-immigration-hitsblack-wages-hardest [https://perma.cc/KKR7-F8FC]; A.J. Delgado, Black
Americans: The True Casualties of Amnesty, NAT’L REV. (July 9, 2014, 8:09
PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/07/black-americans-true-casualtiesamnesty-j-delgado/ [https://perma.cc/ZPE8-FRHV]; P.R. Lockhart, Trump
Rhetoric Pits New Immigrants Against African Americans and Latinos, MOTHER
JONES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/08/trumprhetoric-pits-new-immigrants-against-african-americans-and-latinos/
[https://perma.cc/2SE7-Y2WH]; Fred Lucas, How Illegal Immigration Harms
Black Americans, According to Civil Rights Commissioner, DAILY SIGNAL (Feb.
19, 2017), https://www.dailysignal.com/2017/02/19/how-illegal-immigrationharms-black-americans-according-to-civil-rights-commissioner/
[https://perma.cc/KFL9-DPJJ]; Steven Malanga, The Rainbow Coalition
Evaporates: Black Anger Grows as Illegal Immigrants Transform Urban
Neighborhoods,
CITY
J.
(Winter
2008),
https://www.cityjournal.org/html/rainbow-coalition-evaporates-13062.html
[https://perma.cc/Q53D-P7Z8]; Collier Meyerson, Donald Trump is Trying to
Play
Black
Americans,
NATION
(Mar.
7,
2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/donald-trump-is-trying-to-play-blackamericans/ [https://perma.cc/2ZWA-TQGR]. See also OPPORTUNITY AGENDA,
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discussion fuels antagonism and fans tensions between African
Americans and immigrant communities.
We thus need worker, community, legal, and media education
projects that provide disenfranchised communities with new ways of
understanding one another and can help build strategic alliances. This
Article has attempted to examine IRCA through the prism of
criminalization, and to juxtapose the modern day treatment of
undocumented immigrant workers to the criminalization of black
workers after the Civil War. Undeniably, these two experiences are
distinct, not identical, and it would be inaccurate to equate them.297
Yet new insights into shared histories of criminalization can help mend
rifts between oppressed and exploited communities of color by
breaking down misperceptions of one another. The parallels between
criminalization of work and non-work point toward a deeper shared
identity between African Americans and undocumented immigrants.298
This common experience shows that criminalization has been used not
only to perpetuate economic injustice, but also—more systemically—
to undermine equality, mobility, and control. As a result, both
communities share a highly fraught relationship to freedom and

297

298

BRIDGING THE BLACK-IMMIGRANT DIVIDE 1 (2007) (quoting Alan Jenkins,
Executive Director of The Opportunity Agenda: “The mainstream media have
fixated on potential points of black/immigrant tension, looking for a conflict
storyline. And that storyline has been amply fed by conservative anti-immigrant
groups intent on driving a wedge between the two communities.”); PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, THE STATE OF AMERICAN JOBS 48 (2016) (finding racial
and ethnic differences in how workers view the impact of immigrants on United
States jobs). “In 2016, whites are more likely than Hispanics and blacks to think
that growing numbers of immigrants hurt workers: 54% of whites say that,
compared with 44% of blacks and 18% of Hispanics.” Id. at 48. Ten years ago,
64% of Blacks thought immigrants hurt U.S. workers. Id. The 20-point drop
among Blacks in viewing immigrants as exerting a negative impact on jobs
suggests new opportunities for organizing workers across race, ethnicity, and
immigration-citizenship status. Id.; Chacón, supra note 31, at 467–68
(discussing the claims by some in the civil rights movement that legalizing
unauthorized migrants conflicts with the needs of African Americans).
See Chacón, supra note 31, at 466–68 (explaining that some critics of the
contemporary immigrants’ rights movement reject analogies between the
present-day conditions of immigrants to the plight of African Americans in the
South during the Jim Crow era).
See Bill Fletcher Jr., The Left and Labor Strategy, JACOBIN (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/04/the-left-and-labor-strategy
[https://perma.cc/K4QU-LYJT] [hereinafter Fletcher, Labor Strategy]
(discussing the need for the creation of a new identity for disenfranchised
communities).
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coercion. Perhaps this history and framework can contribute to a
broadened worldview in which the self-interests of African Americans
and low-wage immigrants of color not only intersect but converge to
go beyond short-term pragmatic cooperation.299
Hoffman affirmed the criminalization of undocumented workers in
denying them the right to back pay under the NLRA, thereby
invigorating narratives and legal interventions that splinter workers.300
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit in Agri Processor Company v. N.L.R.B.301
engaged in an alternative legal discourse that promotes unity between
workers when it affirmed a “community of interests” between
undocumented workers and co-workers who were citizens or legalized
workers.302 Agri Processor, the employer, challenged the results of a
union election, claiming both that undocumented workers were not
covered under the NLRA, and could not be included in the same
bargaining unit with legal workers because they lacked a community
of interest.303 In essence, Agri Processor tried to use immigration
status to drive a legal wedge between workers who had successfully
unified.
The D.C. Circuit rejected both arguments, and in addressing
“community of interest,” found that Agri Processor “failed to show
that the interests of undocumented workers as employees differ[ed] in
any way from those of legal workers.”304 Agri Processor had argued
that since the undocumented workers had no legitimate expectation of
continued employment, they shared no community of interests with the

299

300

301
302
303

304

See id. (addressing the need for a worldview “through which workers can
understand and change reality” by “helping people to understand the nature of
the system, the nature of the enemy, the nature and scope of our allies and
potential allies, and the possible directions we can pursue towards or [sic]
victories.”).
See Palma v. N.L.R.B., 723 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2013); Mezonos Maven Bakery,
Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 360 (2015).
Agri Processor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 514 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 9; Motomura, supra note 60, at 1753.
The NLRA vests authority in the N.L.R.B. to determine whether a bargaining
unit is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)
(2012). “Community of interest” is the legal standard used by the N.L.R.B. for
determining whether a bargaining unit, based on its composition of workers, is
an appropriate unit for collective bargaining. See Agri Processor Co., 514 F.3d
at 8.
Agri Processor Co., 514 F.3d at 9.
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authorized workers.305 The D.C. Circuit denied this attempt to divide
workers, instead finding that undocumented workers and legal workers
in the bargaining unit were “identical” when the undocumented
workers “receive the same wages and benefits as legal workers, face
the same working conditions, answer to the same supervisors, and
possess the same skills and duties.”306
By stressing “sameness,” Agri Processor took an important step
toward a narrative in which the relationship between undocumented
workers and citizens and other legalized workers is one of mutuality
arising from a common plight and common interests.307 Its conception
of “community of interest” supported the ability, willingness, and
struggle of workers to identify with one another across the divide of
citizenship and immigration status.308
There is strong work carried on by workers, labor organizers,
activists, and scholars that—like Agri Processor—counter the
narratives of criminalization and division that IRCA’s employer
sanctions and Hoffman represent. A few examples from the author’s
experience include the work of the National Mobilization Against
Sweatshops (“NMASS”) and the Coalition to Protect Chinatown and
the LES. NMASS, an independent workers’ center in New York City,
spearheads a campaign to bring together homecare workers from
across the city. Comprised of Chinese, Caribbean, Puerto Rican, and
African American women, NMASS organizes against mandatory
305

306

307

308

Id. at 3, 9. Agri Processor also argued a lack of community interest because
including undocumented workers in the same bargaining unit diluted the votes
of authorized workers. Id. at 9. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument as well,
holding that the votes of undocumented workers were just as valid as those of
authorized workers since undocumented workers were indeed covered
employees under the NLRA. Id.
Id. See Motomura, supra note 60, at 1752–54, for Professor Motomura’s
discussion of Agri-Processor as an example of citizen proxy arguments for
protecting the rights of undocumented workers–i.e. that failure to do so “can
harm coworkers who are U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or otherwise
working lawfully.” Thus, he explains there are “practical ties between
unauthorized migrants and other persons whose welfare depends on how the law
treats the unauthorized.” Id.
In this respect, the D.C. Circuit opinion appears to go beyond a citizen proxy
argument for protecting the rights of undocumented workers.
See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1236 (discussing “the role of law in
the creation and perpetuation of the conflict that infects the relationship
“between” African American and Latino immigrant low-wage workers, and the
need for “legal interventions” to support cooperation between workers).
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unpaid overtime in the industry.309 Similarly, the Coalition to Protect
Chinatown and the LES unites low-income residents from New York’s
lower east side—Chinese immigrants and working-class African
Americans, Puerto Ricans, and whites—to challenge municipal
rezoning policies that promote gentrification and displacement.310 In
both areas of work, those who are most affected come to recognize
over time through engagement, discussion, community education, and
joint action that—regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, or immigration
status—their respective self-interests can merge into common ground
and shared identity.311
Scholars, journalists, and activists are also critical to this work.
These efforts include the scholarship of Professors Jennifer Gordon
and R.A. Lenhardt in untangling the complex interactions between
309

310

311

Interview by Shirley Lung, Professor, City University of New York School of
Law, with JoAnn Lum, Program Director, NMASS, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (June 1,
2018) (describing NMASS’s Ain’t I A Woman Campaign organizing home care
workers challenging mandatory 24-hour shifts for which they are not paid for
the entire shift). See, e.g., Caroline Lewis, Round-the-Clock Care, Half-theClock
Pay,
VILLAGE
VOICE
(Aug.
2,
2018),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2018/08/02/round-the-clock-care-half-the-clockpay/ [https://perma.cc/EL2N-PMJR] (discussing the efforts of home care
workers to challenge state regulations that permit employers to pay for only
thirteen hours of each twenty-four hour shift).
See THE COLLECTIVE FOR CMTY., CULTURE AND THE ENV’T & PRATT CTR. FOR
CMTY.
DEV.,
PRESERVING
AFFORDABILITY
&
AUTHENTICITY:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHINATOWN WORKING GROUP (2013) (detailing the
rezoning study and plan to preserve Chinatown, the Lower East Side, and
surrounding areas); CWG Rezoning Plan, COALITION TO PROTECT CHINATOWN
&
LES,
https://peoplefirstnyc.org/people-first-rezoning-plan/
[https://perma.cc/V9HJ-5PJ3] (last visited Aug. 21, 2018) (describing goals of
the Coalition); Open Letter to NY Elected Officials, COALITION TO PROTECT
CHINATOWN & LES (Sept. 28, 2016), https://peoplefirstnyc.org/2016/09/
[https://perma.cc/Q86K-8ZVC] (protesting city rejection of communitygenerated rezoning plan offered by Chinese, Latino, African American, and
Caucasian residents in New York City’s Manhattan Community Board 3).
For other examples of such work, see BLACK ALL. FOR JUST IMMIGRATION,
CROSSING BOUNDARIES, CONNECTING COMMUNITIES: ALLIANCE BUILDING FOR
IMMIGRANTS RIGHTS AND RACIAL JUSTICE 3 n.1 (profiling sixteen organizations
engaged in “cross-racial alliance building”); Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note
129, at 1230–32; see generally KIRWAN INST. FOR STUDY OF RACE &
ETHNICITY, AFRICAN AMERICAN-IMMIGRANT ALLIANCE BUILDING (2009)
(highlighting opportunities and challenges of collaborative efforts between
African American and immigrant communities in five grass-roots organizations
working on issues ranging from human rights, infant mortality, workers’ rights,
and voter registration).
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African Americans and new Latino immigrant low-wage workers for a
more nuanced understanding of the conflict between them and to better
identify how these groups can unify.312 Likewise, the research of
Professors Angela Stuesse and Laura Helton in tracing the history of
African Americans and Latino immigrants in Mississippi’s poultry
processing industry shows how “different points of entry into US
systems of racial inequality and low-wage work” lead African
American and Latino poultry workers to arrive at different
interpretations of workplace abuses.313 Understanding the “historical,
structural, and personal rationale for these differences,” rather than
erasing them, they believe, can help forge collaboration.314
As well, African American journalists and activists urge African
American communities against the dangers of immigrant
scapegoating.315 Some also criticize organized labor for abdicating its
responsibility to construct alliances between immigrants and African
Americans by addressing the needs of the black working class
alongside organizing Latino and Asian immigrants.316 Other labor
commentators seek to publicize worker struggles in which African
American, white, and Mexican slaughterhouse workers in the South

312
313
314
315

316

See generally Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129.
Stuesse & Helton, supra note 156.
Id.
See OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, supra note 296, at 20–21 (recommending
approaches in the media and the press to advocate for unity between African
Americans and immigrants). The Opportunity Agenda Report made
recommendations for developing “a proactive strategy to influence readers of
the black press” toward education efforts to overcome this divide. Id. at 20; Bill
Fletcher Jr., Anti-Immigrant in Black Face?, BLACK COMMENTATOR (May 24,
2007),
http://www.blackcommentator.com/231/231_cover_anti_immigrant_in_black_fa
ce_fletcher_ed_bd.html [https://perma.cc/5M24-EZT8]; Bill Fletcher Jr.,
Choices for Black Labor, BLACK COMMENTATOR (Jun. 21, 2007),
http://www.blackcommentator.com/234/234_cover_story_choices_for_black_la
bor_fletcher_ed_bd.html [https://perma.cc/A44Y-R262].
See Fletcher, Labor Strategy, supra note 298 (discussing organized labor’s
recognition of the strategic importance of Latino and Asian immigrants but its
failure to retain a specific focus on the black working class). Fletcher states,
“Many of the efforts to organize immigrants, for instance, have paid little to no
attention to the construction of alliances with African Americans.” Id. This, he
maintains, has increased tensions between African American and immigrant
communities. Id.
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organized together despite the use of racial division and immigration
enforcement against them.317
This Article is a small piece of a larger effort to construct
frameworks and narratives that support immigrants and citizens to
come together to advance one another’s rights—not just as a means for
protecting citizens and other legalized workers318—but as a necessity
based on mutuality arising from shared conditions and shared interests.
This Article offers a historical perspective to help deepen a sense of
shared identity between undocumented immigrants and African
Americans. For it is relationships of shared identity—rather than ones
of pragmatism or even of solidarity—that hold the most promise for
building alliances to take apart systems of criminalization.
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See Bacon, Common Ground, supra note 139; David Bacon, Unions Come to
Smithfield, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 17, 2008), https://prospect.org/article/unionscome-smithfield [https://perma.cc/N44X-9NSU].
See Motomura, supra note 60, at 1751–54 (explaining “citizen proxy” theory for
permitting unauthorized immigrant workers to “assert their rights obliquely”
based on the notion that the welfare of citizens and other authorized workers
“depends on how the law treats the unauthorized.”).

